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PREEMPTION AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
THE CONFLICT CONTINUES UNDER FIFRA
MARY LEE A. HOWARTHt
INTRODUCTION
Disputes over the allocation of regulatory power between federal
and state authorities historically have plagued our system of federalism.
The Framers envisioned a federal government that was centralized
enough to ensure an effective national government, yet still protective of
state autonomy." Both the explosion of federal regulatory power during
the New Deal era2 and the growth of federal agencies during the 1960s
and 1970s3 ostensibly threatened the autonomy of state power in vari-
ous areas of regulation. The judiciary has responded in part to this
tension by applying the doctrine of preemption. This doctrine, which is
derived from the supremacy clause of the Constitution,4 determines
whether federal or state regulation will reign over an area that both
have attempted to control.' Preemption has served to allocate regulatory
t B.A. 1983, Harvard College; J.D. Candidate 1988, University of Pennsylvania.
During the summer of 1986, the author worked as an intern in the chambers of the
judge who decided Wilson v. Chevron Chem. Co., No. 83-762 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17,
1986), but she did not participate in the drafting of the decision.
I See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("In
the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided
between two distinct governments . . . . Hence a double security arises to the rights of
the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that
each will be controlled by itself.").
2 See Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV.
1189, 1243-53 (1986); Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Feder-
alism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623, 624 (1975).
' Twenty-six new federal agencies were created during the period from 1965 to
1975. L. CARTER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND POLITICS 15 (1983).
4 The Constitution states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treatises made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI (emphasis added).
I This Comment defines preemption to mean the invalidation of state law or some
other form of state regulatory action, specifically a judicial award of punitive damages,
by conflicting federal legislation. It should also be noted that invalidation through pre-
emption "implies the existence of federal legislation," and is, therefore, distinguishable
from commerce clause analysis, which invalidates a state law through a clause in the
(1301)
1302 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
powers between the federal and state governments in such diverse areas
as interstate transportation,6 public utilities,7 labor relations,8 and copy-
right." Only recently, however, has the preemption debate extended to
the distribution of regulatory power over the labeling of chemicals that
are potentially dangerous to consumers.'0
Wilson v. Chevron Chemical Co." and Ferebee v. Chevron Chem-
Constitution. See Note, supra note 2, at 623 n.7.
' See, e.g., Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Porter, 273 U.S. 341 (1927) (preempting state
law limiting liability of carrier for damage to property carried in interstate commerce);
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Harold, 241 U.S. 371 (1916) (same); Chicago, R.I. & Pac.
Ry. v. Cramer, 232 U.S. 490 (1914) (same); Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. Greenwood
Grocery Co., 227 U.S. 1 (1913) (preempting state agency regulation imposing penalty
for failure to deliver freight at depots within a state time limit); Adams Express Co. v.
Croninger, 226 U.S. 491 (1913) (preempting state law limiting liability of carrier for
damage to property carried); Southern Ry. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424 (1912) (preempting
law penalizing carriers for failure to deliver freight as soon as received).
' See, e.g., Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953 (1986)
(state utilities commission rate-making order preempted by federal law); Transconti-
nental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Bd., 474 U.S. 409 (1986) (preempting
order of state oil and gas board requiring interstate pipeline to receive fuel "ratably"
from a common gas pool); Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375 (1983) (overruling earlier preemption of state action in conflict
with the Federal Power Act's regulation of local power cooperatives).
8 See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608 (1986) (pre-
empting municipality from conditioning taxi franchise renewal on the timely settlement
of a labor dispute); Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould,
Inc., 475 U.S. 282 (1986) (preempting state law prohibiting repeat violators of NLRA
from doing business with the state); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202
(1985) (preempting state tort of bad faith handling of claim under a disability plan that
was part of collective bargaining agreement).
9 See, e.g., Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964)
("To forbid copying would interfere with the federal policy, found in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8,
of the Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of allowing free access to
copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave -in the public domain.");
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1964) ("To allow a State
by use of its law of unfair competition to prevent the copying of an article . . . re-
present[ing] too slight an advance to be patented would be to permit the State to block
off from the public something which federal law has said belongs to the public.").
10 This Comment examines the preemptive power of the labeling provision in the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986) ("FIFRA"), to displace an award of punitive damages in a failure-to-
warn tort suit, an issue that the Court has never considered. The issue arose in two
recent cases, Wilson v. Chevron Chem. Co., No. 83-762 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1986)
(rejecting defendant's motion to dismiss claim for punitive damages), and Ferebee v.
Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984)
(rejecting claim that FIFRA preempted compensatory damages awarded at trial),
which are the focus of this Comment. The only other federal case that deals with the
preemptive power of FIFRA's labeling directives is Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n
Inc. v. Lowery, 452 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1971). Judge Friendly found that FIFRA pre-
empted a New York City regulation with different labeling requirements. See id. at
439-40.
"' No. 83-762 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1986).
[Vol. 136:1301
PREEMPTION AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
ical Co.12 held that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act ("FIFRA"), a the federal law that governs the use of pesticides,
does not preempt an award of punitive damages in a state tort failure-
to-warn suit against a pesticide manufacturer. These decisions are sur-
prising in light of the fact that FIFRA provides a comprehensive
scheme governing the labeling of pesticides and a system of fines and
punishment to enforce the labeling provisions of the statute.1 4 Wilson
and Ferebee, moreover, focus attention on the doctrinal and practical
considerations in imposing liability in failure-to-warn cases against
manufacturers whose labeling activities are closely regulated by the fed-
eral government. Wilson and Ferebee also are controversial preemption
decisions in an era when judicial attitudes favoring the preeminence of
state autonomy in questions of federalism may bring the doctrine of
preemption into disfavor."' They address preemption of punitive dam-
age issues that have been raised in both the Third and District of Co-
lumbia Circuits without consistent resolution. 6 The decisions also raise
substantial questions about preemption of punitive damages at a time
when the magnitude of these awards is skyrocketing.
This Comment argues that FIFRA should preempt an award of
punitive damages in failure-to-warn tort suits, contrary to the findings
of the Wilson and Ferebee courts." Part I describes the framework of
12 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
7 U.S.C. §§ 13 6-13 6y (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
14 See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (noting the implications of a com-
prehensive scheme of regulation in preemption decisions).
15 See infra notes 91-106 and accompanying text (describing the hesitancy in re-
cent Court decisions to find preemption of state action). After Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), the Court is especially likely to hesitate to
infer any limitation on state sovereignty unless Congress has explicitly and deliberately
created the prohibition. See Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH.
L. REV. 1709, 1722-24 (1985).
16 See infra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
17 Although considerable literature has addressed preemption in many contexts,
none has focused on whether FIFRA preempts state punitive damage awards. A sam-
pling of the literature discussing the preemptive power of various other federal statutes
includes Brooks, Preemption of Federal Labor Law by the Employment-at-Will Doc-
trine, 38 LABOR L.J. 335 (1987) (preemptive power of the NLRA); Glicksman, Fed-
eral Preemption and Private Legal Remedies for Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 121
(1985) (discussing preemption by federal environmental legislation); Note, Administra-
tive Preemption in Consumer Banking Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 911 (1987) (National
Bank Act); and Comment, Tobacco Under Fire: Developments in Judicial Responses to
Cigarette Smoking Injuries, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 643 (1987) (Federal Cigarette La-
beling and Advertising Act).
This Comment takes issue with two recent notes addressing the preemption of
punitive damages in the context of the Atomic Energy Act. In Note, An Analysis of
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.: Are Punitive Damage Awards and Exclusive Federal
Regulation Consistent?, 36 S.C.L. REV. 689 (1985) [hereinafter Silkwood Analysis], an
analysis of the preemption of punitive damages in the context of Silkwood v. Kerr-
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FIFRA, introduces the Wilson and Ferebee facts, and sketches the
courts' decisions. Part II introduces the preemption doctrine and
surveys the range of judicial interpretations of the concept. Part III
examines the first prong of the doctrine, namely the "occupation of a
field of regulation" ("occupation") approach, to determine whether
preemption should occur in situations such as those in Wilson and Fer-
ebee. This Comment argues that congressional desire to occupy exclu-
sively the field of pesticide labeling regulation, as explicitly expressed
in the legislative history and implicitly demonstrated by the comprehen-
sive regulatory scheme contemplated by FIFRA, warrants the preemp-
tion of punitive damage awards in failure-to-warn tort cases. Part IV
addresses the alternative analysis used in Wilson and Ferebee to deter-
mine whether preemption by FIFRA should occur, namely the "fed-
eral-state law conflict" ("conflict") approach. This Comment argues
that due to the regulatory nature of punitive damages, such awards
conflict with the effective functioning of FIFRA. This contention is re-
inforced by an economic analysis of the coexistence of FIFRA's com-
McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984), and an examination of the Atomic Energy Act are
provided. The Note proposes a two-step analysis for courts considering preemption
claims in heavily regulated areas. First, the court should make a traditional preemption
analysis. Second, if no preemption of the cause of action and punitive damages are
found, the defendant's compliance with federal regulations demonstrates nonegregious
behavior and, therefore, should preclude such an award. Silkwood Analysis, supra, at
716.
This Comment also considers the evidentiary impact of compliance with pervasive
federal regulations on an award of punitive damages. However, a much broader pre-
emption attack on punitive damages based on the labeling provision of an entirely dif-
ferent federal statute is given as well. This Comment provides a more in-depth analysis
of the preemption doctrine and argues for preemption under the favorable and unfavor-
able interpretations of both prongs of the doctrine. It also provides a more rigorous
examination of the implications of the coexistence of exemplary damages and a federal
regulatory scheme that has its own punitive program. Finally, not only is a different
judicial response of preemption proposed herein, but this Comment also proposes sev-
eral ideas for legislative solutions to the FIFRA preemption scenario.
Another Note concerning the Atomic Energy Act is Comment, Federal Supremacy
Versus Legitimate State Interests in Nuclear Regulation: Pacific Gas & Electric and
Silkwood, 33 CATH. U.L. REv. 899 (1984), which directly conflicts with the position
taken in Silkwood Analysis, supra. That Comment argues against the preemption of
state regulatory and judicial action by the Atomic Energy Act and proposes an amend-
ment to the act. The proposal would give states explicit authority to regulate nuclear
materials and facilities except when such regulations conflict with federal law. See id.
at 931-42. Such a scheme in the FIFRA context, however, merely begs the same ques-
tion that the Wilson and Ferebee courts have faced: given a federal law that purports to
distribute regulatory power between federal and state authorities, how does a court
respond to overlapping or conflicting regulatory activities? This Comment proposes an
amendment, but also stipulates that it contain either an explicit preemption of punitive
damages in failure-to-warn tort cases or a presumption in favor of preemption in such
cases. See infra notes 246-49 and accompanying text. This Comment also draws the
line for such a proposal at punitive damages, thus leaving intact the ability of exposure
victims to obtain compensation under state tort law.
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prehensive scheme of regulation and .exemplary damages in a state tort
suit. Finally, Part V concludes that the appropriate judicial response to
this dilemma is a finding that FIFRA preempts the award of punitive
damages. It also provides several legislative solutions to the problems
that gave rise to the litigation against Chevron.
I. FIFRA AND THE WILSON AND FEREBEE DECISIONS
A. The Framework of FIFRA
The regulation of pesticides"8 under FIFRA is comprehensive,
particularly in the area of labeling and packaging. FIFRA requires the
continuous registration of all pesticides distributed for sale in the
United States." Registration entails extensive testing of the product by
the manufacturer and the submission of these test results to the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency ("EPA").20 FIFRA requires "the submis-
sion of enormous quantities of technical data,"21 such as "test results
from studies concerning toxicity, carcinogenicity, mutagenicity, repro-
ductive effects, effects on metabolism, environmental fate, and results of
exposure to the substance, as well as results from other studies used to
assess the human and environmental risks posed by a product. 22' The
EPA supplements this information with its own testing, data gathering,
and public hearings.23
If a state also desires to register pesticides or certify pesticide ap-
plicators, it must first obtain approval of its plan from the EPA and
meet existing standards for personnel, funding, and reporting to the
federal government.2 ' While states are given authority to regulate the
sale and use of pesticides to the extent that such regulation does not
18 "The term 'pesticide' means (1) any substance or mixture of substances in-
tended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest, and (2) any sub-
stance or mixture of substances intended for use as a plant regulator, defoliant, or
desiccant. . . ." 7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (1982). For an overview of FIFRA's coverage and
development, see M. WOROBEC, Toxic SUBSTANCES CONTROLS PRIMER: FEDERAL
REGULATION OF CHEMICALS IN THE ENVIRONMENT 38-59 (1984).
1" 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a), (c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
20 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)-(c)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
21 F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION: LAW AND POLICY 540 (1984).
22 M. WOROBEC, supra note 18, at 45. Registrants must also disclose trade
secrets, a requirement that has generated substantial litigation. See, e.g., Thomas v.
Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985); Ruckelshaus v. Mon-
santo Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); McGarity & Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of
Health and Safety Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93
HARV. L. REV. 837, 879 (1980).
23 7 U.S.C. §§ 136a(c)(2)(A), 136s (1982).
24 7 U.S.C. § 136b(a)(2) (1982).
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conflict with FIFRA,2 5 the EPA is. given exclusive authority to regulate
the more specialized areas of labeling and packaging.2" FIFRA also
outlaws state regulation of pesticide use that is inconsistent with federal
labeling requirements,27 thus giving the EPA concurrent control over
pesticide use.28
When a pesticide manufacturer violates either the general require-
ments of FIFRA or the specific guidelines that the EPA has created for
particular products, the EPA will notify the United States Attorney
General who, in turn, will institute criminal or civil proceedings
against the violator.2" Among other things, FIFRA makes it unlawful
to sell or distribute a pesticide that is unregistered, falsify registration
information, or alter the EPA approved composition of the product.3"
In addition, any unilateral effort to "detach, alter, deface, or destroy, in
whole or in part, any labeling required under" FIFRA constitutes a
violation of the law,"' although a label may be legally changed by peti-
tioning for and obtaining EPA approval. 2 Finally, FIFRA authorizes
the EPA to assess a civil penalty on violators of the statute of up to of
$5,000 per offense."3 Criminal prosecution may follow a knowing viola-
tion of FIFRA; a prosecution may result in imprisonment, a fine of not
more than $25,000, or both.3 4 In this statutory setting, the litigation in
Wilson v. Chevron Chemical Co. 5 and Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical
Co. 6 commenced.
B. The Wilson and Ferebee Decisions
On November 13, 1982, Scott Wilson died of injuries resulting
from exposure to a pesticide that occurred during his employment as a
landscaper. The chemical, Ortho Paraquat CL ("OPCL"), is distrib-
uted exclusively in this country by the Chevron Chemical Company
("Chevron"). Mr. Wilson's widow filed a diversity suit against Chev-
ron claiming negligence, breach of warranty, and strict products liabil-
ity. She sought to recover $17 million in compensatory damages and
26 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (1982).
28 See 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1982).
17 See 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(G) (1982).
28 See M. WOROBEC, supra note 18, at 45.
29 See 7 U.S.C. § 136g(c)(1) (1982).
10 See 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(1)(A), (1)(C), (2)(M) (1982).
s' See 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(A) (1982).
32 See Wilson v. Chevron Chem. Co., No. 83-762, slip op. at 4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
17, 1986).
23 See 7 U.S.C. § 1361(a)(1) (1982).
See 7 U.S.C. § 1361(b)(1) (1982).
15 No. 83-762 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1986).
28 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
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$20 million in punitive damages.37 Mrs. Wilson asserted that Chevron
had "failed to adequately warn of the hazards of dermal exposure to
OPCL." 5 As a result, her husband allegedly absorbed the pesticide
through his skin in fatal proportions. Chevron countered that the dece-
dent had died of ingesting OPCL, against which OPCL's label had
given an explicit warning.3 9
Chevron also moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of
punitive damages. It alleged, based on a theory of federal preemption of
state action, that punitive damages were precluded as a matter of law.40
The company argued that punitive damages arising from a state law
failure-to-warn tort claim are regulatory in nature and, therefore, are
preempted by the federal regulations governing OPCL.41 Preemption,
Chevron asserted, is required by the comprehensive federal scheme set
out in FIFRA that has governed OPCL since 1966.42 Under the stat-
ute, the EPA is given extensive authority to regulate the registration,
sale, and use of pesticides, and exclusive control over pesticide
labeling.
43
The facts in Ferebee are strikingly similar to those in Wilson.
Richard Ferebee, an agricultural employee for the United States De-
partment of Agriculture, used a Chevron paraquat product "regularly"
over a three-year period.44 On several occasions, his skin was exposed
to the paraquat; indeed, Mr. Ferebee once used a defective spraying
apparatus that "leaked paraquat solution all over his pants." 45 Subse-
quently, Mr. Ferebee developed pulmonary fibrosis and died on March
18, 1982.46 After a trial that resulted in an award of only $60,000 in
compensatory damages,47 Chevron appealed, claiming that FIFRA pre-
37 See Wilson, slip op. at 3-4.
38 Id. at 5.
39 See id. at 5 n.*.
40 See id. at 2.
41 See id. at 11. For purposes of Chevron's motion, the court decided that Florida
law would apply. See id. at 7-8.
42 See id. at 4.
43 See id. at 4; 7 U.S.C. §§ 13 6-136 y (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The Wilson court
also found that "Chevron has at all times complied with FIFRA and EPA regulations
regarding the labelling and registration of OPCL." Wilson, slip op. at 4. Since 1975,
OPCL has been classified by the EPA as a "restricted use" pesticide, which requires
that all users of the product be "trained and certified pesticide applicator[s]" or under
such a person's supervision. Id. Scott Wilson was neither a certified pesticide applicator
nor was he working under the supervision of such an individual at the time of his
exposure to OPCL. See id.
"' See Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1531-32.
45 Id. at 1532.
46 See id. at 1532-33. Medical experts at the Ferebee trial testified that paraquat
exposure had caused Ferebee's pulmonary fibrosis. See id. at 1533.
47 See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 552 F. Supp. 1293, 1297 & n.17 (D.D.C.
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empted a damage action based on a state failure-to-warn tort claim.48
In analyzing the preemptive power of FIFRA, both the Wilson
and Ferebee courts employed the contemporary, two-pronged preemp-
tion analysis recently enunciated in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp."9
The Silkwood Court refused to find federal preemption of a punitive
damage award. According to Silkwood, preemption can be ascertained
in either of two ways. First, "[i]f Congress evidences an intent to oc-
cupy a given field, any state law falling within that field is pre-
empted."50 Alternatively,
[i]f Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over
the matter in question, state law is still pre-empted to the
extent it actually conflicts with federal law, that is, when it
is impossible to comply with both state and federal law...
or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.51
Silkwood, however, analyzed the preemptive posture of the Atomic En-
ergy Act,52 leaving the Wilson and Ferebee courts free to determine the
preemptive power of FIFRA, the law regulating OPCL. The occupa-
tion analyses in these decisions were limited to examinations of the text
and legislative history of the relevant FIFRA provisions and yielded the
conclusion that Congress did not intend to dominate the regulation of
pesticide labeling. The Wilson and Ferebee courts then explored the
alternative method of finding preemption, taking their cue from the
conflict analysis in Silkwood, which required preemption only when it
was "physically impossible" to comply with potentially conflicting state
1982) (denying Chevron's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict).
4 See Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1532.
49 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (upholding award of punitive damages for the survivor of
an employee who died from plutonium exposure at a nuclear facility subject to the
Atomic Energy Act).
50 Id. at 248 (citing Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conserva-
tion & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-204 (1983); Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947)).
51 Id. (citing Pacific Gas & Elec., 461 U.S. at 204; Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
67 (1941)).
2 See id. at 257-58. The statute at issue in Silkwood was the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
"3 By limiting the occupation test to a strict statutory construction analysis, these
courts made it quite difficult to establish preemption. The Court has considered other
factors, such as the importance of uniformity in regulation, to determine whether Con-
gress intended to occupy a field of regulation. See infra text accompanying notes 62-69
& 85-90.
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and federal directives.54 Since it was not impossible for Chevron to pay
tort damages and comply with FIFRA, the courts reasoned, Chevron's
alternative claim to preemption was rejected.55
II. THE ROLE OF PREEMPTION
A. The Doctrine
The doctrine of preemption, which is derived from the supremacy
clause of the Constitution,56 addresses the distribution of regulatory
power between the federal and state governments when their efforts
overlap. Interpretations of the concept, though, have historically been so
inconsistent that one commentator has questioned "whether the doc-
trine controls the subject matter, or the subject matter the doctrine."5
'In simplest form, the doctrine states that a federal law preempts or
displaces any state law that conflicts with a federal directive.58 The
preemption question is largely a matter of statutory construction that
has evolved into two alternative approaches for determining whether
Congress intended that federal law should preempt state action. First, a
54 See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 257. The Wilson court actually relied directly on
Ferebee for the District of Columbia Circuit's conflict analysis, which in turn relied on
Silkwood. See Wilson, slip op. at 13.
55 See Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1541-42; Wilson, slip op. at 13-15. The Wilson court
concluded, moreover, that questions of fact still existed regarding the specifics of Chev-
ron's behavior during the labeling and testing process. See Wilson, slip op. at 16. On
March 25, 1988, as this Comment was going to print, the jury in the Wilson trial
found Chevron liable for negligence, breach of warranty, and strict products liability.
Mrs. Wilson was awarded $4,089,769.43 in compensatory damages and no punitive
damages. Verdict Sheet and Special Interrogatories, Wilson v. Chevron Chem. Co.,
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 1988) (No. 83-762).
58 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 24 (1824); see also supra note 4
(text of the supremacy clause).
57 Note, supra note 2, at 649.
58 Conflict between federal and state law is ordinarily the exception, not the norm.
As Professors Hart and Wechsler have stated:
Federal law is generally interstitial in its nature. It rarely occupies a
legal field completely, totally excluding all participation by the legal sys-
tems of the states. . . . Federal legislation, on the whole, has been con-
ceived and drafted on an ad hoc basis to accomplish limited objectives. It
builds upon legal relationships established by the states, altering or sup-
planting them only so far as necessary for the special purpose. Congress
acts, in short, against the background of the total corpusjuris of the states
in much the way that a state legislature acts against the background of the
common law, assumed to govern unless changed by legislation.
P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 470-71 (2d ed. 1973). This Comment
acknowledges the interstitial nature of federal regulation but argues that the federal
government intended to control the regulation of pesticide labeling within the entire
federal-state framework of pesticide regulation.
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federal law will displace a state regulation or action if Congress in-
tended to occupy the field of regulation at issue.59 Alternatively, a fed-
eral law will preempt a state law if the latter conflicts either with the
functioning or the objectives of a federal law.60
Various shadings of congressional intent to occupy a field of regu-
lation have been found to have preemptive power. The clearest expres-
sion of preemption, of course, occurs when Congress expresses its ex-
clusive jurisdiction in the language of a statute. For example, the Court
determined that the language in the Wholesome Meat Act, forbidding
the imposition of "'[m]arking, labeling, packaging, or ingredient re-
quirements in addition to, or different than, those made under'" fed-
eral law, was indicative of congressional intent to occupy exclusively
the field of labeling bacon packages. 61 Even if a state law supports fed-
eral goals, that state law may still be invalidated if Congress has arro-,
gated to itself the jurisdiction over regulation in a particular area.
The nature and importance of a particular regulated field also
may imply or require exclusive federal control. State action in this in-
stance may be preempted by a federal scheme even before that scheme
becomes operative.6 2 The Court, moreover, will consider various quali-
ties of the regulatory framework when-deciding whether a state action
in the same area should be displaced. For example, the more pervasive
a scheme of federal law, the more likely it is that Congress intended to
occupy the field of regulation.6" Indeed, the Court has articulated the
59 See 1 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 12.1, 12.4 (1986) [hereinafter R. ROTUNDA];
G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 319
(1986) [hereinafter G. STONE]; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-25
(2d ed. 1988). Preemption under both prongs of the doctrine generally is considered an
issue of statutory construction, though subject to shifting modes of construction and, as
suggested earlier, to shifting perspectives on federalism. See L. TRIBE, supra, § 6-25;
Note, supra note 2, at 623-24.
60 See 1 R. ROTUNDA, supra note 59, § 12.1; G. STONE, supra note 59, at 319;
L. TRIBE, supra note 59, §6-25.
81 Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 530 (1977) (quoting the Fair Meat
Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-201, § 16, 81 Stat. 584, 600 (1967) (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 678 (1982))).
82 See Erie R.R. v. New York, 233 U.S. 671, 681-83 (1914) (congressional regu-
lation of a field brings it under exclusive federal control); Northern Pac. Ry. v. Wash-
ington, 222 U.S. 370, 378-79 (1912) (enactment of statute manifests will of Congress to
bring subject within its control).
63 See, e.g., Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 296 (1971) ("federal concern is pervasive and its regulation
complex" in regard to the "applicable union security clause"); Castle v. Hayes Freight
Lines, 348 U.S. 61, 63 (1954) (The Motor Carrier Act "was so all-embracing that
former power of states over motor carriers was greatly reduced. No power at all was
left in States to determine what carriers could or could not operate in interstate
commerce.").
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assumption that "[t]he scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive
as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it."1
6 4
The very existence of a federal regulatory agency, moreover, may
weigh in favor of preemption through the occupation approach."5 For
example, the Federal Communications Commission's policy of prevent-
ing radio and television stations from censoring the statements of politi-
cal candidates preempted state libel actions against the local stations
that broadcast such statements."6 The creation of a federal agency "may
signify a congressional determination that some jurisdictionally-defina-
ble aspect of the regulated subject matter demands uniform national
supervision and that the judicial grant to the states of jurisdiction to act
is, to that degree, legislatively withdrawn. '67 The Court, for instance,
has dismissed a state tort action for damages caused by a labor union's
picketing in the context of a preemption claim. 8 The importance of
national uniformity in the regulation of concerted activities and unfair
labor practices under federal law precludes state action reaching such
activities because that action might frustrate Congress' national labor
policy goals.
69
The alternative route to preemption is available if a state law or
14 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
85 See, e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 700 (1984) (Federal
Communications Commission "has resolved to pre-empt an area of cable television reg-
ulation"; therefore, "all conflicting state regulations have been precluded" (footnote
omitted)); Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 162 (1982)
(the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 gave the Federal Home Loan Bank Board such
broad authority that the Court refused to find confinement of the Board's authority to
preempt state law to those areas "specifically described by the Act's other provisions"
(citation omitted)); United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 377 (1961) (Veterans Ad-
ministration regulations clearly "intended to create a uniform system for determining
the Administration's obligation as guarantor, which in its operation would displace
state law.").
88 See Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 535 (1959).
87 L. TRIBE, supra note 59, § 6-28.
88 See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
89 See id. at 242-43. But see Farmer v. United Bd. of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290,
295-301 (1977) (rejecting preemption claim that National Labor Relations Act pre-
cluded state action for infliction of emotional distress, and noting that the federal inter-
est in regulating labor relations was distinct enough from the state interest in tort rem-
edy as to reduce the possibility of state interference with the federal regulatory
program); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 61 (1966)
(rejecting preemption claim that a defamation suit resulting from a union-organizing
campaign could not be brought in state court and recognizing "'an overriding state
interest' in protecting its [state] residents from malicious libels"); Head v. New Mexico
Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 429-32 (1963) (comprehensive federal
regulation under Federal Communications Act did not preempt state injunction against
local broadcaster; state regulations were complementary to federal law).
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initiative conflicts with federal law. 0 Federal-state conflict may take a
number of forms, with express preemption representing one extreme on
a continuum of conflict situations. Express preemption occurs when
Congress acknowledges that a conflicting state law exists and expressly
preempts or overrides the state action. 1 In that event, a court simply
analyzes the language of the federal statute in order to determine
whether preemption is appropriate. Moving away from this extreme is
the situation where Congress has not expressly acknowledged a conflict
with state law, but it is nevertheless impossible to comply with state
and federal directives that purport to control the same behavior. For
example, the Court has held in this regard that a state cannot fine or
punish retailers who sell out-of-state syrup that was labeled in compli-
ance with federal law when such labeling conflicted with the labeling
requirements of the retailer's state.
72
More subtle forms of federal-state conflict occur when state actions
conflict with the objectives of federal regulations. The question thus
posed is whether the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. 7 3
A corollary to this is the invalidation of a state action that elicits con-
duct that discourages compliance with or the success of a federal law. 4
For example, the Court struck down a state law governing the labeling
of packaged flour sold within the state because it inhibited the accom-
plishment of the goals of the Federal Fair Packaging and Labeling Act,
most importantly the reduction in consumer confusion about products
from different states.7 5 It should be noted, finally, that state action that
70 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
71 See, e.g., Federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),
Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 514(a), 88 Stat. 829, 897 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)
(1982)) ("Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this
subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supercede any and all state laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan .... ).
Litigation often arises over the scope of state activities covered by the preemption provi-
sion. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 96 (1983) (finding that federal
law that expressly preempted state laws to extent that they "'relate to' employee bene-
fit plans" related to and preempted state antidiscrimination statute (quoting ERISA)).
72 See McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 131-32 (1913).
7 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see also Nash v. Florida Indus.
Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 239 (1967) (invalidating state law that denied unemployment
benefits to eligible recipients because they had filed an unfair labor practice charge
under federal labor law).
"' See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 627-28
(1973) (ordinances imposing curfews on jet flights would lead to bunching of flights
immediately preceding the curfew, "'a result [which] is totally inconsistent with the
objectives of the federal statutory and regulatory scheme'" (quoting Lockheed Air Ter-
minal v. City of Burbank, 11 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 17,910, 17,918 (C.D. Cal. 1970)
(Finding of Fact 78))).
7 See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 524, 542 (1977).
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merely supplements federal law without frustrating the goals of the
federal scheme will not be preempted.7 6 These more subtle forms of
conflict require examination of not only statutory language but also leg-
islative history and regulatory structure and-context in order to deter-
mine the intended scope and purpose of the federal regulation.
B. "Shifting Perspectives" and New Factors
One commentator has urged that preemption is a constitutional
doctrine that is particularly susceptible to changing interpreta-
tions-interpretations that correlate with changes in the Court's view of
federalism.77 During the 1930s and early 1940s, the Court exhibited a
preference for protecting state action in the context of preemption. Pre-
emption by the occupation standard required "an expression of specific
intent to occupy the field. " 78 The conflict standard required a high de-
gree of actual conflict between state and federal law before that federal
law would override state law or action.79 Moreover, the standard re-
quired the balancing of the state and federal interests at stake; the
Court usually favored protecting the autonomy of the states in tradi-
tional activities such as police power.8 '
From the 1940s to the early 1970s, the Court adopted interpreta-
tions of these approaches that were much more favorable to preemption
claims. The conflict approach developed into a "potential conflict" ap-
proach."1 For example, in Pennsylvania v. Nelson,8 2 the Court pre-
empted Pennsylvania's antisedition law because of the potential for in-
consistent outcomes in sedition cases in different courts using different
procedures. 83 The balancing of federal and state interests in the previ-
76 See, e.g., Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, 372
U.S. 714, 722-24 (1963) (upholding state law prohibiting discriminatory hiring); Cali-
fornia v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 730, 735-38 (1949) (upholding state regulation outlawing
transportation not licensed by the ICC).
7 See Note, supra note 2. The Note tracks interpretations from the 1930s to the
mid-1970s, providing a chronological ordering of the spectrum of preemption interpre-
tations just explored. Another commentator has suggested that the Court's historical
inconsistency in preemption decisions is explained by the fact that the Court "bases its
decision[s] on the pre-emption ground in order to avoid reaching some other constitu-
tional question." Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Con-
struction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208, 210 (1959).
11 Note, supra note 2, at 627.
79 See id.
80 See id. at 628-30.
81 See id. at 636 & n.83.
82 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
83 See id. at 509. With regard to the occupation standard of preemption analysis,
the Court emphasized the comprehensiveness of the federal statute at issue, the Smith
Act of 1940, the national nature of the sedition problem, and the difficulties that would
arise in state and federal administration of sedition regulation. See id. at 502-07.
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ous era was supplanted by a presumption of federal supremacy best
articulated by Chief Justice Warren: "The relative importance to the
State of its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid
federal law, for the Framers of our Constitution provided that the fed-
eral law must prevail." 4
Growing federal preeminence was also evident in litigation over
Congress' intent to occupy a field of regulation. Hines v. Davidowitz5
established that a state law is preempted when it "stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress." 6 With this decision the Court "substituted a purportedly
objective assessment of the needs attending a statute's operation for the
practice of defining the occupied field through total reliance upon Con-
gress' subjective will."8" Various factors enjoyed influence in the
Court's occupation analyses during this period. Qualities such as the
pervasiveness of the federal regulation, the importance of the national
interest being regulated,88 and the unobstructed functioning of federal
law were "invoked on an ad hoc basis to justify particular preemptive
decisions."89 The Court even went so far as to base decisions on policy
considerations, such as fairness to the interested parties, when the occu-
pation and conflict approaches failed to answer the question of federal
preemption. 0
During the 1970s, however, the Court again displayed significant
deference to state interests, resembling the view implicit in the preemp-
tion cases decided during the 1930s and early 1940s.9' The "potential
84 Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962) (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2).
8- 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
86 Id. at 67.
87 Note, supra note 2, at 631.
s "When the Federal Government completely occupies a given field or an identi-
fiable portion of it ... the test of preemption is whether 'the matter on which the State
asserts the right to act is in any way regulated by the Federal Act.'" Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 213-
14 (1983) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947)).
89 Note, supra note 2, at 633 (citing City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal,
411 U.S. 624 (1973) (pervasive federal regulation of air commerce); Teamsters Local
20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964) (pervasive federal regulation of labor relations);
Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) (same)).
90 See, e.g., Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 286 (1971) (emphasizing uniform substantive law in labor
regulation); Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 533 (1959)
(considering fairness to local broadcasters subject to both federal and state control); San
Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 241-245 (1959) (stressing the
importance of national labor policy and of avoiding inconsistent standards of law be-
tween state tort damages and federal authorities); Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346
U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953) (same).
91 See Note, supra note 2, at 639-51.
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conflict" standard of the Warren era was limited,92 and the Court
showed a renewed willingness to balance state and federal interests.9
The occupation approach began to reflect a presumption of state regu-
latory jurisdiction when Congress failed, by legislative silence, to regu-
late a given area.9' As the Court stated in New York State Department
of Social Services v. Dublino9 5 "[wihere coordinate state and federal
efforts exist within a complementary administrative framework, and in
the pursuit of common purposes, the case for federal pre-emption be-
comes a less persuasive one." '
This deference to state action has continued through the present, 7
92 See id. at 647.
93 See id. at 649-50.
, See id. at 643-44.
9 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
98 Id. at 421.
'7 See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987) (holding
that state antitakeover law was not preempted by Williams Act); California Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987) (refusing to hold that federal civil rights
laws preempt state law providing pregnancy disability benefits because there was no
conflict between state requirements and a federal law that provides a floor below which
state benefits may not drop); Fisher v. Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260 (1986) (refusing to find
that Sherman Antitrust Act preempted state anticompetition law); Midlantic Nat'l
Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986) (refusing to pre-
empt state environmental law forbidding abandonment of land prior to decontamination
despite explicit provision in federal bankruptcy law allowing abandonment); Container
Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983) (refusing to preempt state
franchise tax in absence of federal law designed to regulate state taxation); Arkansas
Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375 (1983) (overruling
earlier preemption of state action in conflict with the Federal Power Act's regulation of
local power cooperatives); Commonwealth Edison Co., v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 634
(1981) (rejecting preemption claim when state action merely conflicted with "general
expressions of 'national policy' "); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)
(stating a reluctance to infer preemption in questionable cases because "Congress did
not intend to displace state law"); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979)
(refusing to preempt state family law unless it does "major damage" to "clear and
substantial" federal interests); Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978)
(declining to preempt state pension statute with predecessor federal law even though
successor federal law expressly preempted state law); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
435 U.S. 151 (1978) (refusing to preempt state law requiring tankers in local waters to
have more stringent safety features than required by federal law because state law
achieved safety without changing safety design, which is an area of exclusive federal
control). But see, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (preempting
state tort of bad faith handling of an insurance claim that was covered by federal labor
law); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (holding that ERISA preempts
aspect of state law that prohibited discrimination on the basis of pregnancy when prac-
tice was lawful under federal law); Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v.
Jones, 460 U.S. 669 (1983) (finding state tort action against union claiming that union
interfered with the plaintiff's employment contract was preempted by federal labor
law); FidelityFed. Say. & Loan v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982) (finding that
federal regulation of savings and loan associations preempted state common law rule
prohibiting use of due-on-sale clauses); Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick &
Title Co., 450 U.S. 311 (1981) (preempting state award of damages to local carrier in-
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most notably with two decisions interpreting the preemptive force of the
Atomic Energy Act.98 In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy
Resources Conservation and Development Commission,99 the Court
declined to preempt a state moratorium on construction of nuclear
power plants because Congress had failed to prohibit state actions that
might frustrate or undercut Congressional goals."' The Court rejected
preemption despite a finding that "the Federal Government has occu-
pied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except the limited pow-
ers expressly ceded to the States,"' ' and despite the clear federal objec-
tive of promoting nuclear power through the Atomic Energy Act.'0 2 In
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,'0 3 the Court declined to find that the
Atomic Energy Act preempted an award of punitive damages to the
survivors of a nuclear power plant employee who was exposed to pluto-
nium, again despite a finding that Congress intended to occupy the field
of nuclear safety and despite Kerr-McGee's compliance with federal
safety requirements.'0 4 The Court stated that it was the defendant's
burden to show that Congress "expressly supplanted" the traditional
state function of awarding punitive damages, and nothing in the legisla-
tive history demonstrated this directive.'0 5 The Court also imposed a
prodigious obstacle for preemption claimants who argue that a state
directive conflicts with federal law. Preemption, the Court stated,
would not be appropriate unless it was "physically impossible" to si-
multaneously comply with federal and state requirements. 6
The Silkwood Court's refusal to preempt punitive damages has led
to disagreement among the circuits in failure-to-warn cases. Ferebee v.
Chevron Chemical Co.,'07 as explained earlier, closely followed
Silkwood and rejected the argument that FIFRA preempted state tort
compensatory damages. 08 The Third Circuit, however, declined to use
the conflict analysis adopted by the Ferebee court in Cipollone v. Lig-
jured by interstate carrier's abandonment of rail line); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430
U.S. 519 (1977) (preempting state law governing food labels because it conflicted with
federal labeling requirements).
" Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
99 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
100 See id. at 220-23.
101 Id. at 212.
102 See id. at 221.
103 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
'0' See id. at 249-51.
105 See id. at 255.
108 See id. at 257.
10 736 F.2d. 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
109 See supra notes 44-55 and 'accompanying text.
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gett Group, Inc."°9 In Cipollone, the Third Circuit found that federal
law preempted stricter state cigarette package labeling requirements be-
cause Congress did not intend for cigarette manufacturers to choose be-
tween federal product safety requirements and paying tort damages.'" 0
The Third Circuit focused on the conflict with the objectives and func-
tioning of the federal law approach exemplified by Hines, instead of
the physical impossibility test imposed by Silkwood."'
III. PREEMPTION BY FIFRA:
THE OCCUPATION OF A FIELD OF REGULATION STANDARD
Wilson v. Chevron Chemical Co."12 and Ferebee v. Chevron
Chemical Co. '" are symptomatic of the recent judicial hesitancy to find
preemption of state action. Both decisions were based on the narrow
interpretations of the occupation and conflict standards exemplified by
the preemption analysis in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp."4 The occu-
pation analyses of FIFRA offered by the Wilson and Ferebee courts,
however, present a number of problems. The courts' refusal to preempt
tort damages can also be criticized in light of both the narrow and lib-
eral approaches to preemption espoused at different times by the Court.
A. Congressional Intent
Both the Wilson and Ferebee courts initiated their investigations of
preemption by FIFRA with an examination of the language and legis-
lative history of the statute, in order to determine whether Congress
intended to occupy the field of pesticide labeling regulation. The Wil-
son court began by examining the language of the relevant FIFRA pro-
vision, Section 24(b), which was added in 1972. According to this Sec-
tion, states "shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for
labeling and packaging in addition to or different from those required
109 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 907 (1987).
110 See id. at 186-88. Cipollone is consistent with a more recent Court decision
preempting the traditional state function of providing tort remedies. In Allis-Chalmers
Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220-21 (1985), the Court found preemption of the Wis-
consin tort of bad faith handling of an insurance claim in the context of a collective
bargaining agreement and, presumably, the remedies that might arise through liability
because federal labor law provided procedures for resolution of insurance disputes.
"I See Note, Common Law Claims Challenging Adequacy of Cigarette Warnings
Preempted under the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965: Cipol-
lone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 754, 767 (1986).
... No. 83-762 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1986).
113 736 F.2d. 1529, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
114 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
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pursuant to this Act.""' 5 The Wilson court apparently assumed that the
scope of this prohibition reached only as far as legislatively-created la-
beling requirements. The Ferebee court dealt with this issue more di-
rectly by asserting that a state may not legislatively impose additional
labeling requirements: "FIFRA does not allow states directly to impose
additional labelling requirements .. . ."" The District of Columbia
Circuit, however, then explained that state action that has the effect of
changing federal labeling requirements is permissible because it falls
within the states' power to regulate the "sale or use" of pesticides au-
thorized in the previous subsection of FIFRA."'
Such a reading of FIFRA, however, conflicts with the language
and legislative history of the statute. First, the language of Section
24(b) can be interpreted as a broad prohibition on state interference
with federal efforts to label pesticides. Any labeling "requirement" con-
ceivably covers a variety of state actions that interfere with or put addi-
tional burdens on FIFRA's labeling requirements, including the award
of punitive damages in a successful tort action. In the view of the
Court, common law remedies are no more immune from preemption
than are legislatively enacted statutes." 8 As the Court stated in the con-
text of examining the preemptive powers of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act:
Our concern is with delimiting areas of conduct which must
be free from state regulation if national policy is to be left
unhampered. Such regulation can be as effectively exerted
through an award of damages as through some form of pre-
ventive relief. . . . It may be that an award of damages in a
... Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, § 24(b), Pub. L. No.
92-516, 86 Stat. 973, 997 (codified as amended as part of FIFRA at 7 U.S.C.
§ 136v(b) (1982)).
"1 Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1541 (emphasis added).
11 See id. Section 24(a) of FIFRA reads: "A State may regulate the sale or use of
any pesticide or device in the State, but only if and to the extent the regulation does not
permit any sale or use prohibited by this subchapter." 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (1982).
"I See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 107 S. Ct. 1549, 1554-55 (1987)
(preempting common law breach of contract and tort claims against insurance company
that improperly processed benefits claim); Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick
& Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317-31 (1981) (preempting Iowa's common law action for
damages against rail carrier that abandoned railroad lines); Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 138-39 (1976)
(preempting state injunction prohibiting union from refusing to work overtime). In-
deed, in the area of labor relations, early cases suggested that preemption of state com-
mon law was more acceptable than displacement of state statutes enacted to regulate
labor activities. See Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 290-91 (1971) (citing Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356
U.S. 634, 635 (1958)). Punitive damages, in any case, are codified in several states. See
infra note 178 and accompanying text.
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particular situation will not, in fact, conflict with the active
assertion of federal authority. The same may be true of the
incidence of a particular state injunction. To sanction either
involves a conflict with federal policy in that it involves al-
lowing two law-making sources to govern. In fact, since rem-
edies form an ingredient of any integrated scheme of regula-
tion, to allow the State to grant a remedy here . . . only
accentuates the danger of conflict.119
It is unlikely, moreover, that Congress would have designated federal
control over labeling in Section 24(b) if it thought that the provision
should be thwarted by state action ostensibly authorized by Section
24(a). This is supported by the definition of the term "to use any regis-
tered pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling" that Con-
gress provided at the beginning of FIFRA 20 The term means, quite
simply, "to use any registered pesticide in a manner not permitted by
the labeling." '121 Congress thereby specified what uses were consistent
with federal labeling and outlawed those that were inconsistent.
122
Thus, Section 24(b) may prohibit not only direct state regulation of
labeling but also indirect state action that has the effect of adding addi-
tional requirements to those of the statute.
A closer look at FIFRA's legislative history also indicates that no
provision of the statute condones state action that has the effect of re-
quiring more stringent labeling requirements. The Senate Report1 23
quoted in both Ferebee 24 and Wilson125 refers to subsections (a) and
(c) of FIFRA Section 24, which give states the authority to "regulate
the sale or use" of a pesticide and allow states that are certified by the
EPA to aid the agency in the pesticide registration process. 12 The very
same paragraph of the Senate Report states, however, that "[s]ubsection
(b) preempts any State labeling or packaging requirements differing
from such requirements under the Act."11 27 There is no indication that
119 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246-47 (1959).
120 7 U.S.C. § 136(ee) (1982).
121 Id. (emphasis added). The definition goes on to exclude uses that are condoned
by the product's EPA-approved label and uses that are authorized by other sections of
FIFRA.
122 See 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(G) (1982) (declaring it unlawful "to use any regis-
tered pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling").
12 See S. REP. No. 92-838, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 30, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3993, 4021.
12 See Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1541.
125 See Wilson, slip op. at 12.
12 See 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a), (c) (1982) (emphasis added).
127 S. REP. No. 92-838, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 30, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3993, 4021.
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Congress intended for its explicit statement of federal control over la-
beling to be circumvented by other provisions of the statute that give
different regulatory responsibilities to the states. Indeed, the Senate Re-
port indicates that the federal government intended to retain exclusive
authority over labeling and packaging, "preempt[ing]," in the Senate's
phrasing, any state requirements to the contrary.
The historical development of pesticide regulation and FIFRA
also demonstrate a congressional intent to preempt state regulation of
the labeling and packaging of pesticides. Lawmakers, in fact, have long
believed that the manufacture, use, and packaging of chemical pesti-
cides required more uniform, "[flederal regulation for the protection of
users, consumers and the general public."'128 In 1947, Congress
promulgated FIFRA and assigned regulatory jurisdiction over pesti-
cides to the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA"). 129 In
1962, the publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring,30 which criti-
cized the USDA's enforcement of pesticide law, alerted many to the
importance of pesticide control. 13' During the 1960s, growing concern
over the public health and ecological effects of pesticides led to a num-
ber of efforts to increase federal control over pesticide regulation. These
efforts culminated in a presidential advisory commission on pesticides,
the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency, and amendments
to FIFRA in the 1960s and 1970s. 1' 2 The Court has recently reviewed
the historical development of FIFRA and noted: "As first enacted,
FIFRA was primarily a licensing and labeling statute . . . . [Recent]
amendments transformed FIFRA from a labeling law into a compre-
hensive regulatory statute."133
128 Id. at 7, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3993, 3999.
Congress passed a precursor to FIFRA, the Federal Insecticide Act of 1910, ch. 191, 36
Stat. 331. In 1946, the Council of State Governments urged the states to adopt a model
pesticide statute, the Uniform State Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. That
same year, Congress began hearings on "more comprehensive Federal legislation,"
which would make uniform the pesticide regulations adopted by various states. See S.
REP. No. 92-838, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3993, 3999.
129 See M. WOROBEC, supra note 18, at 40.
130 R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
131 See Megysey, Governmental Authority to Regulate the Use and Application of
Pesticides: State vs. Federal, 21 S.D.L. REV. 652, 653 (1976). See generally R. CAR-
SON, supra note 130, at 91-92, 156-61, 275 (criticizing the USDA).
1"2 See S. REP. No. 92-838, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9, reprinted in 1972 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3993, 4001. Another Senate Report also noted the
urgent need for strengthening the federal regulation of pesticides. See S. REP. No. 92-
970, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
4092, 4093.
"" Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 991 (1984); see also Thomas v.
Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 571-75 (1985) (detailing the history of
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This analysis of FIFRA's legislative history is not meant to imply
that federal statutes that preempt state regulations must be overwhelm-
ingly federal in nature. On the contrary, a number of federal statutes
that are considered cooperative ventures between federal and state gov-
ernments are still considered federally preeminent."" A House of Rep-
resentatives report on the 1972 amendments to FIFRA indicates that
FIFRA is cast from the same mold. It states that the improved FIFRA
establishes a coordinated Federal-State administrative system
to carry out the new program. The States are given prime
responsibility for the certification and supervision of pesti-
cide applicators. The Federal Government sets the program
standards the States must meet. State authority to change
Federal labeling and packaging is completely preempted, and
State authority to further regulate 'general use' pesticides is
partially preempted.
1 35
The House hearings on the 1972 amendments to FIFRA also contained
a discussion of this delicate but important concern over the division of
regulatory responsibility between the states and the federal govern-
ment.13' The House report reiterated that "[in dividing responsibility
... for the management of an effective pesticide program, the Com-
mittee [on Agriculture] has adopted language which is intended to com-
pletely preempt State authority in regard to labeling and packaging.
M 37
Hence, a more complete survey of FIFRA's legislative history demon-
strates that while specific aspects of pesticide regulation have dearly
been left to the states, Congress intended exclusively to regulate pesti-
cide labels. Contrary to the findings of the Wilson and Ferebee courts,
FIFRA).
1"4 Federal statutes often contain a "savings clause" that allows complementary
regulation by the states. See 1 R. ROTUNDA, supra note 59, at § 12.1. For example,
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 states:
Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities com-
mission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any State
over any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the
provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982); see also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct.
1637, 1653 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 "forecloses pre-emption on the basis of conflicting 'purpose' as
opposed to conflicting 'provision' "). Indeed, the notion of "cooperative federalism" im-
plies a cooperation between state and federal authorities in the regulation of a particu-
lar field. See Pierce, Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism, and Administrative Law:
Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 607, 645 (1985).
H. REP. No. 92-511, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1972) (emphasis added).
, See id. at 16.
137 Id. (emphasis added).
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Congress did intend to occupy the field of labeling regulation.
B. Congressional Objectives
1. The Role of the EPA
As the foregoing analysis of FIFRA's legislative history indicates,
Congress explicitly indicated that the federal government should retain
exclusive control over pesticide labeling. This intention is also implicit
in the regulatory framework established by Congress to govern these
chemicals. It is significant, for example, that Congress considered the
regulation of pesticides so important that it created the EPA to promul-
gate and enforce environmental regulations. Congress also supplies the
EPA with substantial annual funding and staffing in order for it to
develop the expertise needed to test new pesticides and develop safe
product labels. This scheme is further evidence that Congress intended
that the federal government occupy the field of labeling regulation."3 8
The Court's assessment of the role of the NLRB in labor regulation is
analogous to the labeling function of the EPA in the FIFRA context:
"[T]he unifying consideration of our [preemption] decisions has been
regard to the fact that Congress has entrusted administration of the
labor policy for the Nation to a centralized administrative agency,
armed with its own procedures, and equipped with its specialized
knowledge and cumulative experience."
13 9
The preemption issue in the FIFRA context, however, juxtaposes
the EPA's expertise in labeling not against the expertise of a state envi-
ronmental agency or a state legislature but against a lay state jury. A
liability verdict coupled with a punitive damage award defines the line
between a safe label and an illegal label and identifies which aspects of
a defendant's behavior the jury finds particularly egregious.' 40 It is un-
likely that this line will be static, however, as various juries may not
define a legal label on a consistent basis. Such outcomes might also
disregard the cost-benefit mode of decisionmaking that Congress au-
thorized the EPA to use and that characterizes much environmental
legislation.141 Juries, moreover, are not likely to possess the expertise
11. Cf cases cited supra note 65 (noting the implications of a strong federal
agency).
139 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242 (1959).
140 This Comment argues that punitive damages are regulatory in nature, sup-
porting the assertion made here that a punitive award regulates or defines legal label-
ing behavior. See infra text accompanying notes 167-203.
141 See F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. TARLOCK, supra note 21, at 519,
542-45; Rogers, Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmental
Decisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 191, 206-14 (1980).
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needed to provide sufficiently instructive and safe warnings. The exten-
sive testing conducted by the EPA and pesticide manufacturers indi-
cates that such an endeavor is beyond the abilities of a lay jury. The
consolidation of pesticide regulation under FIFRA is consistent with
this contention, as the expertise of the well-funded EPA has long been
considered by Congress to be superior to that of even state regulatory
bodies. 42 The consistency and expertise required for labeling provide
further evidence that Congress intended to leave regulation of labeling
to the federal government.
A corollary to the significance of federal labeling expertise is the
pervasiveness of the EPA's role in labeling. The labeling process is an
entirely cooperative project between the EPA and the manufacturer:
they work together to develop a safe label based on shared test data.'
43
The final label, though, must be approved by the EPA. Indeed, a one-
word variation from the approved label could result in punishment of
the manufacturer under FIFRA. This pervasive control over the label-
ing process indicates that Congress had no desire to allow states to
redefine the standard of safe labeling that is developed by the EPA and
further supports congressional intent to occupy the field of pesticide
regulation. 44
2. National Uniformity in Labeling
The importance of national uniformity in labeling also underscores
the congressional desire to occupy the field of pesticide labeling regula-
tion. When Congress makes a legislative determination that national
uniformity in supervision is required to fulfill its objectives, it indicates
that Congress arrogated to itself the jurisdiction to regulate a given
field.145 Different state and federal standards obviously threaten uni-
formity. When a court is faced with conflicting federal and state direc-
tives, it must resolve, as did the Court in San Diego Building Trades
142 See S. REP. No. 92-838, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9, reprinted in 1972 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3993, 4021.
143 Some commentators, however, have suggested that federal regulatory agencies
typically act at the behest of the industries they purport to regulate. Proponents of this
"capture theory" claim that regulations serve the interest of industry rather than the
interests of consumers, workers, and other supposed beneficiaries of regulatory pro-
grams. See generally P. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATION 175-
93 (1981) (analyzing the incentives of regulators); K. SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, OR-
GANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1986) (discussing the mechanics of
capture theory); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARv. L. REv. 1667, 1684-87 (1975) (arguing that capture theory oversimplifies ex-
planations of regulatory behavior).
144 Cf cases cited supra note 63 (noting the implications of pervasive regulation).
145 See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-47 (1959).
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Council v. Garmon, "the potential conflict of two law-enforcing au-
thorities, with the disharmonies inherent in two systems, one federal
the other state, of inconsistent standards of substantive law and differ-
ing remedial schemes."1 6 Judicial resolutions are likely to vary consid-
erably, further frustrating the scheme of regulation designed by
Congress.
The achievement of national uniformity in the regulation of pesti-
cide labeling is especially important. Assume, for example, that Chev-
ron is faced with a number of unconsolidated tort claims arising out of
consumer use of OPCL. Exposure victims bring suits in ten states
claiming that OPCL's label failed to warn of the hazards of dermal
exposure. Assume further that Chevron is found not liable in three
states, but it is found liable in the rest of the cases based on a variety of
different applications of substantive law. The liability verdicts, further-
more, are based on different aspects of the OPCL label and different
activities of Chevron concerning the labeling of OPCL. Several ques-
tions now arise: What will Chevron put on its label when faced not
only with an EPA-approved label, but also with ten state labeling stan-
dards, each defined differently by tort verdicts and varying punitive
awards? How will Chevron react, for example, when Alabama decides
that defective warning A on OPCL's label and the behavior needed to
formulate it are egregious enough to warrant punitive damages, while
New Jersey regards warning A as safe but finds warning B and the
behavior needed to formulate it worthy of punishment? Furthermore,
what if Pennsylvania also finds warning B punishable, yet awards only
half the damages that the New Jersey case awarded?
147
146 Id. at 242.
147 To the extent that either failure-to-warn claims are pursued in state courts
that do not follow the transaction-based joinder approach of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or that these claims are brought in forums that allow such joinder but deem
it inappropriate in this instance, multiple, inconsistent adjudications may result. If,
however, joinder is available, a plaintiff may join with another plaintiff similarly in-
jured by OPCL to prosecute her claim, thereby reducing the potential for the numerous
inconsistent outcomes hypothesized above. Similarly, plaintiffs injured by OPCL could
pursue a class action in federal or state court against Chevron and reduce the possibility
of multiple labeling standards. Consolidation is problematic, though, when injuries oc-
cur in a number of different states, making the application of one state's law to the
consolidated claim inappropriate. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S.
797, 822 (1985) (finding application of Kansas law to plaintiffs in eleven states injured
by large gas leak "sufficiently arbitrary and unfair as to exceed constitutional limits,"
and remanding for further consideration of choice of law); see also Miller & Crump,
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions after Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 57-67 (1986) (detailing the problems generated by
choice of law rules for class actions after Shutts). If a number of different state laws are
ultimately applied to as many plaintiffs, the possibility of conflicting labeling standards
remains. See generally Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing
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Chevron may respond to this scenario by using different labels in
different states that may or may not comply with EPA requirements.
Chevron might also gear its label exclusively to the label standards dic-
tated by claims in heavy agricultural states, perhaps ignoring the label-
ing standards set by FIFRA and by tort cases in industrial states with
few failure-to-warn claims. At the very least, this situation can cause
confusion among manufacturers concerning what types of labels to pro-
duce and what type of behavior from which to refrain. Inconsistent and
unpredictable labeling by manufacturers clearly obstructs the achieve-
ment of the congressional goal of protecting the public through safe,
well-tested pesticide labels.
The potential for confusion among manufacturers has derivative
consequences for consumers. Assume again that Chevron uses different
labels in different states, and that a label's warning is a function of the
number and magnitude of failure-to-warn punitive awards in that
state. The flow of interstate commerce, however, may put several states'
labels on one shelf. A proliferation of different labels could cause signif-
icant consumer confusion regarding the trustworthiness of any particu-
lar label or warning. Consequently, FIFRA's goal of consumer safety is
threatened by the coexistence of federal and state labeling standards.
This threat is yet another indication that Congress intended to occupy
the field of pesticide labeling regulation.
3. Distinguishing Silkwood
Despite these indications that Congress intended to occupy the
field of pesticide labeling regulation, Silkwood still stands as an obstacle
to FIFRA's preemption of punitive damages. Silkwood, it will be recal-
led, rejected a claim of preemption of punitive damages despite a find-
ing that "the Federal Government has occupied the entire field of nu-
clear safety concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded to the
states." 4" The Court's holding largely depended on the legislative his-
tory of the Price-Anderson Act, 49 which provided a scheme for partial
the Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 37 (1983)
(surveying these and other issues relating to punitive awards in various mass tort scena-
rios). For a description of the mass toxic tort litigation arising from the herbicide Agent
Orange, see P. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE
COURTS (1987).
14s Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 249 (quoting Pacific Gas & EIec. Co. v. State Energy
Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 212 (1983)).
"" Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438
U.S. 59, 87-94 (1978) (sustaining the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act in the
face of due process and equal protection challenges).
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federal indemnification of operators of licensed nuclear facilities. Since
the Price-Anderson Act implicitly assumed that victims of nuclear in-
jury could still pursue state tort remedies, the Court reasoned, such
remedies were not preempted and merely complemented the partial fed-
eral indemnification scheme.'50
There is other evidence in the history of the Price-Anderson Act,
however, that indicates that Congress contemplated the continuing exis-
tence of only compensatory damages and not exemplary awards. As the
Senate stated, the statute created "'a practical approach to the necessity
of providing adequate protection against liability arising from atomic
hazards as well as a sound basis for compensating the public for any
possible injury of damage arising from such hazards.' ""' The Court
may have mistaken congressional statements regarding compensation as
covering the entire remedial scheme available in state tort law, instead
of only reparative damages. It is far from clear, then, that Congress
intended to preserve the states' ability to punish nuclear plant operators
or that the Silkwood Court's refusal to preempt such damages was
correct. 1
52
Silkwood may also be viewed as a show of deference to the tradi-
tional exclusivity of the states in resolving tort disputes. "Punitive dam-
ages have long been a part of traditional principles of state tort law,"
according to the Court, and will not be displaced unless "expressly sup-
planted."' 53 This stance is consistent with the Court's recent hesitancy
to preempt state law.' 54 The development of punitive damages in this
country, however, indicates that punishing tort defendants is not a
traditional aspect of tort law.' 55 At the very least, punishment is a less
151 See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251-56 (discussing the Price-Anderson Act amend-
ments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)).
151 SEN. REP. No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1957 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1803, 1810 (emphasis added) (quoting testimony of Lewis L.
Strauss, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission).
12 See Silkwood Analysis, supra note 17, at 711-14; see also Silkwood, 464 U.S.
at 266 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (Silkwood turns not on whether a victim can be com-
pensated under state law, but rather whether "the jury can impose a fine on a nuclear
operator in addition to whatever compensation award is given.").
13 Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 255.
154 See supra notes 91-106 and accompanying text.
15 For an in depth discussion of the nature and development of punitive damages,
see infra text accompanying notes 167-203. In 1983, Justice Rehnquist provided the
following description of punitive damages in the context of deciding whether such
awards are available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982):
Despite these attempted justifications, the doctrine of punitive dam-
ages has been vigorously criticized throughout the Nation's history. Count-
less cases remark that such damages have never been "a favorite of the
law." The year after § 1983 was enacted, the New Hampshire Supreme
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"traditional" function of the remedial scheme in tort than compensa-
tion.156 As such, the preemption of punitive damages poses less of a
threat to state autonomy than the preemption of compensation and de-
serves a preemption analysis distinct from the broad sweep of "tradi-
tional" state tort law principles.
157
In addition to the anomalies of Silkwood, the application of
Silkwood is arguably inappropriate in an occupation analysis of
FIFRA. As an initial matter, the EPA's control over every word on
OPCL's label is more pervasive than federal control over nuclear plant
safety. The importance of national uniformity, moreover, is much more
compelling in the labeling context. The success of a label, which is de-
termined by whether persons with diverse comprehension abilities will
understand and follow label warnings, would be undermined by a
proliferation of labels.""8 In addition, the legislative history of the
Atmic Energy Act has no bearing on whether Congress intended to
occupy.the field of pesticide labeling regulation, and in any case, there
is no indication in FIFRA's legislative history that Congress assumed
that punitive damages would continue to be available in state tort
suits.'59 On the contrary, the existence of FIFRA's comprehensive sys-
tem of enforcement and punishment, whereby the Attorney General
pursues civil, and in some instances, criminal actions, indicates that
Congress intended the federal government to control the punishment of
unacceptable labeling behavior.leo Congress, put simply, did not invite
Court declared: "The idea of [punitive damages] is wrong. It is a mon-
strous heresy. It is an unsightly and unhealthy excrescence, deforming the
symmetry of the body of the law."
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 58 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1872)).
16 It is also difficult to square the Silkwood Court's deference to a traditional
domain of state law after the Court abandoned its attempt to define "traditional"
spheres of state action in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,
537-47 (1985).
1I7 The Silkwood decision glosses over the distinction between compensatory and
punitive damages and "proceeds as if pre-emption of punitive damages would require
pre-emption of compensatory damages as well." 464 U.S. at 267 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting). This Comment asserts the importance of this distinction and proposes the
preemption of exemplary awards coupled with the preservation of compensation in
state tort law.
18 See Hadden, Labeling of Chemicals to Reduce Risk, LAW & CONrEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1983, at 235, 261 ("Since the efficacy of labels as a risk control device
depends on their being understood and used by readers, existence of a multiplicity of
labeling systems undermines the purpose of labels.").
19 See supra notes 115-37 and accompanying text (reviewing the language and
legislative history of FIFRA).
10 Cf Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 646 (1958) (implying that a
federal punitive scheme could preempt state punishment since the absence of a federal
punitive scheme does not preempt state authority to punish).
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the states to join in enforcement or any other aspect of labeling
regulation."' 1
This interpretation of the existence of direct punishment provi-
sions in FIFRA has a certain equitable allure. As one commentator has
argued, it is unfair for a state jury to punish activities of manufacturers
in highly regulated industries. 6 2 Compliance with pervasive federal
regulations demonstrates nonegregious behavior by a defendant that is
unworthy of punitive damages.' This argument is certainly convinc-
ing in the context of a failure-to-warn claim based on a label whose
every word must be approved by the federal government. The federal
government alone should monitor activities that are directed by it or are
the product of its intervention, as well as impose fines and other pun-
ishments when labeling behavior is unacceptable. 64
IV. PREEMPTION AND FIFRA:
THE CONFLICT WITH STATE LAW STANDARD
A. The Nature of Punitive Damages and the Tension With FIFRA
The alternative avenue for preempting punitive damages in a state
failure-to-warn claim is establishing that such state action conflicts with
valid federal law. The courts in Wilson v. Chevron Chemical Co.' 65
and Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co.'16 unfortunately did not examine
the relatively simple case of a federal statute that explicitly overrides a
clearly conflicting state statute. They analyzed, rather, the more subtle
conflict between the implicit regulation that exemplary fines impose
and the regulatory scheme established by FIFRA. A careful review of
the nature and function of punitive damages in tort law will demon-
strate that these awards conflict with the objectives and operation of
FIFRA and should be displaced by federal law in the pesticide labeling
context.
'"" An employer has successfully argued that the Occupational Safety and Health
Act, 29 U.S.C. 667(b) (1982), preempts state criminal prosecutions of officials at a
manufacturing firm. See People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 510 N.E.2d 1173,
1175-76 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal granted, 515 N.E.2d 115 (Ill. 1987).
162 See Silkwood Analysis, supra note 17, at 712.
163 See id. at 716. Indeed, it is debatable whether such behavior is even negligent
enough for tort liability.
164 Cf Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311,
326 (1981) ("It would be contrary to the language of the [Interstate Commerce Act] to
permit litigation challenging the lawfulness of the [defendant's actions] when the Com-
mission has expressly found them to be reasonable.").
165 No. 83-762 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1986).
166 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
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1. Punitive Damages
Traditionally, an award of damages in a tort action served to com-
pensate the victim:16 7
A person injured by 'the commission of a tort is entitled to
actual pecuniary compensation for the injury sustained
. . . .He is not to be placed in a better position than he
would have been in had the wrong not been done. Only such
damages are recoverable for a tort as can be shown with rea-
sonable certainty and as are the direct, natural, and proxi-
mate consequences of the defendant's wrongful act.16
Historically, tort damages were awarded to put the plaintiff in the po-
sition she would have been had she not been injured. Damages in ex-
cess of full compensation were denied, as such awards were considered
an unconstitutional taking of private property. 69
The original compensatory purpose of the tort remedy, however,
was supplanted with punitive and other "remedial goals." One theory
asserts that punitive damages evolved from a remedy known in both
Roman and English common law as "multiple damages,"170 which
were often imposed to punish defendants whose torts involved outra-
geous behavior' or as a justification for damages that were obviously
in excess of the amounts required to compensate plaintiffs.17 2 Other
early cases awarded extra or punitive damages to compensate for intan-
gible harms such as mental anguish and insult.17 Another rationale
167 See K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 622 (1980).
168 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Guard, 283 Ky. 187, 197, 139 S.W.2d 722, 727
(1940) (quoting 15 AM. JUR. Damages § 65 (1938)).
169 See, e.g., Rieve v. McCormick, 11 Neb. 261, 264-65, 9 N.W. 88, 89 (1881)
(noting that "[clonstitutional guarantees of the rights of private property amount to but
little if courts sanction its practical confiscation under the name of exemplary or puni-
tive damages").
170 See K. REDDEN, supra note 167, at 24-25; see also Note, Exemplary Damages
in the Law of Torts, 70 HARv. L. REV. 517, 518 (1957) (tracing the history of the
doctrine of exemplary damages, which originated in eighteenth century England). Mul-
tiple damages actually predated punitive damages by several thousand years, as such
awards were employed by the Code of Hammurabi in 2000 B.C. See K. REDDEN,
supra note 167, at 24.
171 See K. REDDEN, supra note 167, at 26 (citing Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep.
768, 769 (K.B. 1763), which involved an illegal trespass, assault, and false imprison-
ment by police upon entering a citizen's home).
172 See id. at 26 (citing Earl v. Tupper, 45 Vt. 274, 275 (1873)).
171 See, e.g., Stuart v. Western Union Tel. Co., 66 Tex. 580, 584-85, 18 S.W.
351, 354 (1885) (promoting compensation through punitive damages for harms such as
mental suffering, which could not be measured in pecuniary terms); Fay v. Parker, 53
N.H. 342, 397 (1873) (justifying compensation through punitive damages for harms
such as insult, which were not compensable at common law); Breadmore v. Carrington,
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holds that the differential treatment of similar offenses in civil and
criminal law catalyzed the growth of punitive damages in civil cases."' 4
While a number of theories explain the evolution of punitive dam-
ages, today they are awarded in American jurisdictions to punish civil
defendants for their acts and to deter both them and others from com-
mitting similar acts.17 5 A remedial scheme may now include a punitive
damage award payable by a defendant who was found to have commit-
ted a "wilful, wanton, reckless, malicious, oppressive, or brutal act,"
178
as well as compensation of victims of the wrongdoer's actions for their
actual injuries. 177 Punitive damages are part of the common law in
most states, are codified for certain torts in some states, but are out-
lawed in four states. 78 In most jurisdictions, proof of actual damages is
a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages.' In other jurisdic-
95 Eng. Rep. 790, 792-94 (K.B. 1764) (asserting that damages for intangible, personal
torts such as slander and actions of imprisonment were not excessive).
171 See Freifield, The Rationale of Punitive Damages, 1 OHIO S. L.J. 5, 9 (1935)
(offenses to the person were punished much less severely in criminal law than were
property offenses, giving rise to increased punishment for offenses to the person in civil
suits).
171 See, e.g., Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 63 (1897) (contending that the dispen-
sary act of South Carolina is intended "to protect the public morals, public health and
public safety"); Kirschbaum v. Lowrey, 165 Minn. 233, 236, 206 N.W. 171, 173
(1925) (clarifying that punitive or exemplary damages are awarded by a jury's discre-
tion for punishing or deterring willful, malicious acts); Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic
Church of the Sacred Hearts of Jesus and Mary, 262 N.Y. 320, 324, 186 N.E. 798,
800 (1933) (arguing that individuals who engage in willful and malicious disturbance
of dead bodies must be punished both for their crimes and to deter others from commit-
ting similar acts); Gill v. Selling, 125 Or. 587, 591, 267 P. 812, 814 (1928) ("[p]unitive
or vindictive damages are assessed on the theory of punishment and as a deterrent effect
on others who might commit similar wrongs"). See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEE-
TON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 (1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON] (explaining
that punitive damages are given in addition to the plaintiff's full compensation in order
to punish the defendant and to deter both the defendant and others from future like
acts).
178 K. REDDEN, supra note 167, at 23.
"I See C. MCCORMICK, THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 77 (1935); PROSSER & KEE-
TON, supra note 175, § 2.
178 See Seltzer, supra note 147, at 44 & n.39 (noting that Louisiana, Massachu-
setts, Nebraska, and Washington prohibit punitive damages and that states such as
California, Colorado, and Georgia have codified the remedy for certain torts).
"I See, e.g., PSG Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 417 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 918 (1970) (punitive damages could not be recovered in light of
the lack of evidence that appellant suffered any actual damages); James v. Public Fin.
Corp., 47 Cal. App. 3d 995, 1000, 121 Cal. Rptr. 670, 673 (1975) (acknowledging the
"well established rule. . . that exemplary damages cannot ordinarily be assessed with-
out a showing by the plaintiff as a prerequisite that he has sustained actual damages
from defendant's wrongful act"); Village of Peck v. Denison, 92 Idaho 747, 751-52,
450 P.2d 310, 314-15 (1969) (requirement of actual damages before an award of puni-
tive damages guarantees both that a legal interest has been violated and that punitive
damages are not claimed without evidence of legal injury); Dicker v. Smith, 215 Kan.
212, 216, 523 P.2d 371, 375 (1974) ("rationale of the rule requiring actual damages
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tions, however, courts may award punitive damages following proof of
only "nominal" damages, that is, an infringement on the plaintiffs le-
gal rights without the plaintiff suffering any actual harm. s°
Contemporary criticisms of punitive damages abound. A focal
point of attack has been the anomaly of a punitive remedy in civil law.
One commentator has argued that punitive damages subject the defend-
ant to a situation analogous to double jeopardy, because after punitive
damages are awarded in a civil case, the defendant may also be pun-
ished in a criminal prosecution. 81 This argument is consistent with a
defendant's attempt to mitigate her liability in a civil trial by presenting
proof of a previously paid criminal fine levied for the same act. 82 In
addition, the civil defendant facing punishment is afforded none of the
procedural safeguards available to the criminal defendant, including a
burden of proof requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the
privilege against self-incrimination. 8 3
before punitive damages may be awarded is that we do not punish conduct, no matter
how malicious or reprehensible, which in fact causes no injury"); Note, supra note
170, at 528-29 (general requirement of actual damages for punitive damages because a
defendant cannot be punished only for wrongful conduct).
180 See, e.g., Maganini v. Coleman, 168 Conn. 362, 364, 362 A.2d 882, 883
(1975) (state law regards the infringement of rights as a nominal injury for which
damages are required); Marshall v. Georgia Power Co., 134 Ga. App. 479, 480, 214
S.E.2d 728, 730 (1975) ("[n]ominal damages are always allowed for any invasion of a
property right whether or not actual damages result therefrom"); Shell Oil Co. v.
Parker, 265 Md. 631, 644, 291 A.2d 64, 71 (1972) (award of punitive damages in
Maryland must be preceded by at least an award of nominal damages); Coonis v. Rog-
ers, 429 S.W.2d 709, 716 (Mo. 1968) (punitive damages cannot be awarded unless
actual or nominal damages are recovered); Mathis v. State Dep't of Roads, 178 Neb.
701, 707, 135 N.W.2d 17, 20 (1965) ("[n]ominal damages are those awarded, not as
compensation for pecuniary loss, but in recognition of a legal wrong where there is no
proof of actual damages"); Bryce v. Wilde, 39 A.D.2d 291, 293, 333 N.Y.S.2d 614, 616
(punitive damages may be awarded after an award of nominal compensatory damages
and a showing of "actual malice" by the defendant), affd, 31 N.Y.2d 882, 292 N.E.2d
320, 340 N.Y.S.2d 320 (1972).
181 See Walther & Plein, Punitive Damages: A Critical Analysis: Kink v. Combs,
49 MARQ. L. REV. 369, 384 (1965).
182 See, e.g., Saunders v. Gilbert, 156 N.C. 463, 476, 72 S.E. 610, 615 (1911)
(recognizing the rule, "which we think is general, that when the defendant has been
indicted and punished for the crime, the pecuniary punishment can be considered by
the jury in reduction of punitive damages"); Smithwick v. Ward, 52 N.C. 64, 66 (1859)
(evidence may be admitted at trial that the defendant has been convicted and punished
in order to mitigate punitive damages for the same transaction); Wirsing v. Smith, 222
Pa. 8, 16, 70 A. 906, 909 (1908) (jury may consider evidence of a defendant's convic-
tion and sentence for his crime in mitigation of punitive damages).
183 See, e.g., Morris v. MacNab, 25 N.J. 271, 281, 135 A.2d 657, 663 (1957)
("inclusion of punitive damages in the plaintiff's tort judgment, which is allowable for
the private wrong to the individual rather than the accompanying wrong to the public,
may effectively supplement the criminal law in punishing the defendant"); Pratt v.
Duck, 28 Tenn. App. 502, 507, 191 S.W.2d 562, 564 (1945) (criminal punishment for
an act does not exempt liability for punitive damages for the same act); see also Al-
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Punishment for criminal acts, moreover, consists of fines and finite
sentences set by a legislature. Civil punishment departs considerably
from these limits because the trier of fact has complete discretion over
the amount of the award and, consequently, bases its decision on sub-
jective observations at trial. This approach may lead to awards that do
not accurately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's behavior. 1 4 Ex-
acerbating this problem is the fact that punitive damages for similar
acts are inconsistent within and across jurisdictions. 8 5 Judicial review
of such awards for "impropriety of motive or gross disproportion" has
not produced the consistency of punishment found in the criminal
law.188
Defendants also have challenged punitive damages on constitu-
tional grounds. They have argued that the imposition of penal sanc-
tions, albeit in a civil adjudication, is unconstitutional whenever defend-
ants are not afforded the protection of the fourth, fifth, and sixth
amendments.' Punitive damages, moreover, may constitute a violation
of the notice aspect of due process. Criminal statutes provide notice to
potential criminal defendants as to what types of behavior are unlawful
and as to what penalties will accompany convictions. Civil defendants,
in contrast, have notice neither as to what sort of behavior is egregious
enough for punishment nor as to what their punishment will be once
liability is established. 88 As one commentator points out, "[p]unitive
damages are assessed for 'wanton, wilful, or malicious conduct,' which
are hardly specific criteria."8 9
dridge, The Indiana Doctrine of Exemplary Damages and Double Jeopardy, 20 IND.
L.J. 123, 136 (1945) (Indiana case law has supported the proposition that the legisla-
ture is not empowered to grant punitive damages when the defendant is open to crimi-
nal prosecution for the same act.); Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil
Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1158, 1184 (1966)
(implementation of punitive damages appears to be unjustified when the criminal law
is in operation although it may be "a useful substitute for criminal law in areas where
criminal punishment is inappropriate").
184 See Walther & Plein, supra note 181, at 383-86.
185 See K. REDDEN, supra note 167, at 38. Criminal punishment, though, is ar-
guably inconsistent as well. See Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?,
66 TEx. L. REv. 1, 8-10 (discussing the goal of uniform sentencing in the sentencing
guidelines recently promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission).
"Ie See McCormick, Some Phases of the Doctrine of Exemplary Damages, 8
N.C.L. REv. 129, 130 (1930).
11 See, e.g., Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 150-51 (1956) (issue
dismissed); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1943) (same);
Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 523 (1885) (same); see also Herald Co. v.
Harper, 293 F. Supp. 1101, 1105 (E.D. Mo. 1968), affd, 410 F.2d 125, 131 (8th Cir.
1969) (issue was given further consideration but ultimately dismissed).
188 See K. REDDEN, supra note 167, at 610-11.
189 Id. at 611. A final constitutional argument against punitive damages criticizes
the "chilling effect" such awards have on the free speech of defendants in defamation
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Another attack on punitive damages questions the rationale behind
transferring monies from the defendant to the plaintiff in the name of
an exemplary award. Some commentators have labeled them "unjust
enrichment" or overcompensation of plaintiffs."' They argue that these
awards should be distributed to society-the entity actually punishing
the defendant. 9 These "windfalls" may encourage not only embel-
lished complaints, but also frivolous litigation. 92 This sort of litigation
is facilitated by both a plaintiff's, opportunity to present evidence of a
defendant's "deep pocket" at trial and contingent fee representation.
1 93
The most prominent criticism of punitive awards concerns their
escalating size. One cause of this increase is arguably the institutional
incompetence inherent in the tort process. While juries are well-
equipped to assess the magnitude of compensation needed to make a
victim whole, they simply lack the expertise to determine the size of a
penal award that will effectively punish and deter a defendant whose
behavior can only be understood with specialized knowledge. 94 Al-
though the trier of fact's wide discretion over penal damages, is limited
somewhat by the requirement that such awards bear a reasonable rela-
tionship to compensatory damages, it is questionable whether this rela-
tionship exists.1 5 For example, in Smith v. American Family Mutual
Insurance Co.,' 96 the plaintiff sued for tortious breach of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the context of an automobile
liability insurance contract. The court held that a compensatory award
of $3,000 did not inherently render a punitive award of $50,000 exces-
sive.' 97 And while compensatory damages are based on the actual in-
actions. See Note, Punitive Damages in Defamation Litigation: A Clear and Present
Danger to Freedom of Speech, 64 YALE L.J. 610, 613 (1955).
190 See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 177, § 78 (punitive damages are unjus-
tifiable because actual damages already make plaintiff whole); Long, Punitive Dam-
ages: An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 870, 886 (1976) (if punitive damages
are intended to punish on behalf of society, then they should be paid to society rather
than an individual).
191 See Long, supra note 190, at 886-87.
12 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 175, § 2 (discussing frivolous litigation);
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 177, § 78 (noting how such windfalls encourage the pur-
suit of claims that otherwise would be economically unattractive).
13 See K. REDDEN, supra note 167, at 628-29.
194 See id. at 39. Obviously, some tort claims are resolved with bench trials, but it
is not clear that judges have any more expertise in assessing a defendant's behavior
than lay juries.
195 See Duffy, Punitive Damages: A Doctrine Which Should Be Abolished, in
THE DEFENSE RESEARCH INST., THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 12 (1969)
(citing cases in which punitive damages bear no rational relationship to compensatory
damages).
199 294 N.W.2d 751 (N.D. 1980).
197 See id. at 767. Other recent examples of "nonexcessive" punitive damage
awards are found in Puz v. McDonald, 140 Ariz. 77, 79, 680 P.2d 213, 215 (Ariz. Ct.
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jury suffered and thus are easily reviewed, the same cannot be said of a
punitive award. Indeed, an appellate court reviewing a punitive award
has no record of how the trier of fact determined that the punitive dam-
ages awarded were sufficient to punish and deter the defendant.198
Finally, considerable controversy surrounds the imposition of pu-
nitive damages in mass tort litigation. Multiple defendant suits, it is
urged, result in awards that may be appropriate for one defendant but
clearly excessive for others.' 99 This occurs because while juries "theo-
retically can gauge the financial status of each defendant and assess an
award sufficient to punish but not overwhelm any defendant, juries are
not wont to act with such finesse. The awards are almost certain to
hurt some defendants unduly if they hurt others enough." 200 Punish-
ment, therefore, is unreasonably harsh for the latter defendants, al-
though deterrence still may be achieved. The multiple plaintiff scenario
also presents problems. Mass tort cases for which a class of plaintiffs
has not or cannot be certified involve a number of different suits, each
with the potential for large punitive awards. Defendants finding them-
App. 1984) ($40,000 for emotional distress, outrage, and anxiety did not preclude an
award of $200,000 punitive damages); Robinson v. Winn-Dixie Stores, 447 So. 2d
1003, 1005 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding $750,000 award of punitive damages
against a multimillion dollar corporation that erroneously charged a customer with
shoplifting), affd in part and quashed in part, 472 So.2d 722, 725 (Fla. 1985) (af-
firming district court's reversal of trial court's directed verdict against punitive dam-
ages, and remanding pursuant to alternative order granting new trial on issue of puni-
tive damages); Auburn Harpswell Ass'n v. Day, 438 A.2d 234, 237 (Me. 1981)
(upholding $50 award for actual damages and $3,000 for punitive damages for chop-
ping down a tree); see also Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Dam-
ages: Some Lessons from History, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1271-74 & n.233 (urging
the incorporation of the excessive fines clause into the fourteenth amendment to limit
state-awarded punitive damages such as the $3 billion exemplary fine imposed on Tex-
aco in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 1519 (1987)).
The United States Attorney General recently established a Tort Policy Working
Group that examined tort awards in the context of the crisis in liability insurance. See
REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND
AFFORDABILITY (1986) [hereinafter REPORT]. The Report indicates that the average
product liability jury verdict increased from $393,850 to $1,850,452 during the period
1975 to 1985. See id. at 36. This increase, though, is skewed by the sharp jump in
million-dollar or greater verdicts. See id. at 39. Nonetheless, the Report points out that
the growth of noneconomic damages such as punitive damages have "play[ed] a major
role in the explosive growth of large verdicts . . . ." Id. The study then provides data
from Cook County, Ill., demonstrating that the average punitive damage award jumped
from $63,000 in 1970-74 to $489,000 in 1980-84, far outstripping inflation in those
gears. See id. at 39-42.
191 See K. REDDEN, supra note 167, at 43.
99 See Long, supra note 190, at 885; see also D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9 (1973) (Although no consistent rule exists in mass disaster
litigation, in some courts a culpable defendant will escape civil liability that would have
been imposed in the case of a single plaintiff.).
200 See Long, supra note 190, at 885.
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selves in this situation may be subjected to repeated punishment for a
single act.20 ' Additionally, plaintiffs suing first in time and receiving
compensatory and punitive damage awards may exhaust their defend-
ants' wealth to such a degree that later plaintiffs stand little chance of
collecting on subsequent awards.202 The potential also exists for plain-
tiffs in different jurisdictions to receive radically different punitive dam-
age awards based on the same set of facts.203
The contemporary arguments against punitive damages apply with
added force in the Wilson or Ferebee contexts. An exemplary award
exposes Chevron to a position akin to double jeopardy, because not only
can it be punished through civil damages, but it may also be subject to
criminal prosecution if it has violated FIFRA. Chevron faces jury fines,
moreover, without any of the constitutional safeguards afforded defend-
ants in criminal prosecutions for the same acts. If punitive awards are
not instructive and consistent, which is quite possible given the exper-
tise required for labeling pesticides, then Chevron arguably has not
been given the notice required by due process in the criminal context.
Furthermore, the jury that Chevron may face at trial will have wide
discretion over a scientific matter in which it lacks expertise. Nor will
the jury be bound to follow the intent of Congress or the cost-benefit
mode of decisionmaking that Congress authorized the EPA to use. Fi-
nally, if OPCL causes multiple plaintiff litigation that is not procedur-
ally consolidated, the imposition of large punitive damage awards
against Chevron by early plaintiffs may leave later litigants undercom-
201 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 175, § 2. Generally, a defendant also
may introduce evidence of other actions against her when the plaintiff seeks a punitive
award. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838-39 (2d Cir. 1967)
(reversing punitive damages award in products liability action against manufacturer of
anti-cholesterol drug). In Roginsky, Judge Friendly had difficulty seeing "what even
the most intelligent jury would do" with such attempts to reduce excessive awards. Id.
at 839.
202 See D. DOBBS, supra note 199, § 3.9; K. REDDEN, supra note 167, at 118.
Generally, however, a defendant may introduce evidence of her financial resources
when punitive damages are sought. Id. at 122. Note, however, that recent attempts to
obtain certification of a class of plaintiffs under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure by arguing that earlier plaintiffs would exhaust the defendant's assets have
failed. See, e.g., In re School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d 996, 1002-08 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 182, 318 (1986).
203 Such results were apparent in the hundreds of suits filed against Richardson-
Merrill Inc. over the drug MER/29. For example, the Roginsky trial verdict awarded
$17,500 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages to the plaintiff.
See Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 834. The plaintiff in Toole v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 251
Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967), who also developed cataracts in connection
with using MER/29, was awarded $175,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000
in punitive damages. The plaintiff allowed the punitive damages to be halved in order
to avoid a new trial on the issue of those damages. See id. at 693-94, 60 Cal. Rptr. at
403.
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pensated, thus undermining the state goal of compensating tort victims.
2. The Conflict Between Punitive Damages and FIFRA
The evolution and function of punitive damages in tort law thus
indicates that the remedy directs or regulates behavior by delineating a
standard of conduct that is tortious, and by deterring the defendant and
others from engaging in such conduct.20 4 These characteristics, how-
ever, were largely ignored by the District of Columbia Circuit in.Fer-
ebee and by the Wilson court when it relied on the circuit court's analy-
sis. The Ferebee court prefaced its remarks on a conflict with state tort
law by conceding that "[diamage actions, typically, . . . can have both
regulatory and compensatory aims."20 5 The court then explained the
variety of effects these awards will have on manufacturer defendants:
The verdict itself does not command Chevron to alter its la-
bel-the verdict merely tells Chevron that, if it chooses to
continue selling paraquat in Maryland, it may have to com-
pensate for some of the resulting injuries. That may in some
sense impose a burden on the sale of paraquat in Maryland,
but it is not equivalent to a direct regulatory command that
Chevron change its label. Chevron can comply with both
federal and state law by continuing to use the EPA-approved
label and by simultaneously paying damages to successful
tort plaintiffs such as Mr. Ferebee.
Moreover, tort recovery in a case such as this one may
also promote legitimate regulatory aims. . . . Successful ac-
tions of this sort may lead manufacturers to petition [the]
EPA to allow more detailed labelling of their products ....
In addition, the specter of damage actions may provide man-
ufacturers with added dynamic incentives to continue to keep
abreast of all possible injuries stemming from use of their
product so as to forestall such actions through product
improvement.2 °6
The decision never clarifies exactly how or why such a damage award
204 See S. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AcCIDENT LAW 277-86 (1987) (ar-
guing that tort liability and statutes are different forms of regulation); Note, supra note
183, at 1158-59 (stating that "punitive damages attempt[] to achieve, through civil liti-
gation, results otherwise associated with the criminal law"); Silkwood Analysis, supra
note 17, at 703, 709 (discussing the regulatory purpose of punitive damages).
205 Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1540.
206 Id. at 1541-42.
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will not "command" Chevron to change its label, yet still have a "regu-
latory effect" by encouraging petitions to the EPA and promoting in-
formation-gathering on pesticide injuries. The confusion may arise
from the fact that the Ferebee court was only reviewing the compensa-
tory damages of $60,000 that were awarded at trial.20 7 In addition to
the reparative function of such awards, they can have an incidental reg-
ulatory impact.208 Inasmuch as compensatory damages are nonregu-
latory, however, Ferebee has little application to the preemption of pu-
nitive damages.209
To the extent that compensatory damages encourage or elicit be-
havior from defendants,210 though, the Ferebee analysis sheds light on
the preemption problem. Significantly, the behavior that the court pre-
dicted a damage award would promote is the identical behavior that
FIFRA and the EPA already require.211 Thus, the imposition of exem-
plary fines on a defendant who was in compliance with FIFRA212 es-
tablishes another standard of testing, information-gathering, and label-
ing than is demanded by FIFRA. This conflicts with the functioning of
the federal law as manufacturers are torn by two different behavioral
directives.2 2 Punitive fines also conflict with the objectives of FIFRA,
which seek safe labeling as defined by EPA expertise. As Justice Black-
mun argued in his dissent in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,2"' a fed-
erally preeminent statute and exemplary awards cannot coexist:
Were [the defendant] to continue adherence only to the fed-
eral standard, it would presumably be in continuous viola-
tion of state, law-an indication that the jury award in this
207 See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 552 F. Supp. 1293, 1297 & n.17 (D.D.C.
1982).
208 See K. REDDEN, supra note 167, at 40.
209 The Wilson court recognized this dilemma. See Wilson, slip. op. at 13-14.
210 Note that punitive damages can have a partial compensatory effect. See Long,
supra note 190, at 875-76; Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation,
74 MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1295-99 (1976); Walther & Plein, supra note 181, at 381-82;
Note, supra note 183, at 1162-63.
211 See supra notes 21-32 and accompanying text.
212 See Wilson, slip. op. at 4 ("Chevron has at all times complied with FIFRA
and EPA regulations regarding the labelling and registration of OPCL."); Ferebee, 552
F. Supp. at 1304 & n.38 (jury was correctly instructed that it could consider Chevron's
compliance as a fact "in deciding whether the label is adequate"); see also Silkwood
Analysis, supra note 17, at 713 (noting Chevron's compliance with FIFRA in
Ferebee).
21' The Third Circuit recognized this issue in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 907 (1987), when it did not use
the Ferebee "physical conflict" analysis. See id. at 186-88; see also supra text accompa-
nying notes 107-11 (distinguishing the conflict analysis in Cipollone from the analysis
used in Ferebee and Silkwood).
224 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
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case was too small to serve its purpose. A [defendant] that
continues to meet only the federal standard therefore pre-
sumably will receive increasingly large punitive sanctions in
subsequent personal injury suits, until compliance with the
state-imposed safety standard is obtained. At that point, of
course, the federal safety standard will have been entirely
supplanted. It is incredible to suggest that Congress intended
the Federal Government to have the sole authority to set
safety regulations, but left intact the authority of States to
require adherence to a different state standard through the
imposition of jury fines. The obvious conflict shows that pu-
nitive damages are pre-empted.
2 1 5
It might be argued, nonetheless, that state and federal laws do not
conflict because FIFRA merely provides a floor or minimum of label-
ing safety above which states may impose stricter standards.216 It would
not be impossible, therefore, for manufacturers to comply with both
standards if they comply with the more strict state standard of pesticide
labeling. Indeed, this argument is quite plausible in the context of the
local regulation of the registration of pesticides, because FIFRA pro-
vides that states may enact EPA-approved regulations concerning regis-
tration that are stricter than EPA standards.217 Congress, however, did
not contemplate a scheme of labeling regulation that allowed state stan-
dards to coexist, let alone vary above a federal minimum. This is evi-
denced by the fact that no provision for stricter state labeling standards
was inserted into FIFRA, as it was for registration. The language of
the statute supports this reading of congressional intent, as it prohibits
states from "impos[ing] or continu[ing] in effect any requirements for
labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required
[by FIFRA]. '12"' FIFRA prohibits any labeling that varies above or
215 Id. at 265 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
211 See Comment, Preemption Doctrine in the Environmental Context: A Unified
Method of Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 197, 212-13 (1978) (proposing that preemp-
tion questions in the environmental law context be analyzed with a presumption that
federal law provides minimum regulatory standards above which the states may create
stricter regulations); cf. Note, Getting Away with Murder: Federal OSHA Preemption
of State Criminal Prosecutions for Industrial Accidents, 101 HARV. L. REV. 535, 545
(1987) (discussing "nationwide floor of effective safety and health standards" created by
OSHA that do not conflict with local criminal prosecutions of employer conduct).
217 See 7 U.S.C. § 136v(c) (1982). This has been recognized by the courts. See,
e.g., National Agric. Chem. Ass'n v. Rominger, 500 F. Supp. 465, 469-70 (E.D. Cal.
1980) (refusing to preempt state registration standards that varied above federal mini-
mum and contrasting the legislative history of federal registration and labeling).
2 8 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
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below the labeling standards developed and approved by the EPA.219
Thus, any state regulation of labeling that differs from FIFRA will
yield zero-sum results: When a manufacturer complies with a different
state labeling requirement, it necessarily violates FIFRA.22 °
B. An Economic Analysis of the Conflict Between
Preemption and Punitive Damages under FIFRA
On occasion, this Comment has implicitly used economic theory to
analyze the preemption dilemma. For example, in examining the im-
portance of uniformity within the occupation test of preemption, this
Comment analyzed the incentives and responses of manufacturers and
consumers to nonuniform labeling to argue in favor of preemption.2
The conflict with state law test, which requires an analysis of the coex-
istence of punitive damages and a comprehensive federal law, provides
particularly fertile ground for an economic analysis of the Wilson and
Ferebee scenarios.222 Although a comprehensive economic analysis of
the coexistence of FIFRA and punitive damages is beyond the scope of
this Comment, a brief look at the issues that such an approach raises is
provided because it highlights the conflicts created by this juxtaposition.
The touchstone of this analysis will be the conclusion by the Ferebee
court, upon which the Wilson decision relied, that there is no conflict
219 See Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n v. Lowery, 452 F.2d 431, 439 (2d Cir.
1971) (noting that more stringent New York City labeling requirements for aerosol
pesticides "would, in fact, be inconsistent with FIFRA regulations rather than supple-
mental. Indeed, it could be contended that the conflict between local and federal re-
quirements is most significant where federal law would require no special label and the
City Regulations would.").
220 Obviously, a state labeling requirement that is less strict than FIFRA will put
a complying manufacturer in violation of FIFRA. When a state labeling directive is
identical to FIFRA, a manufacturer may then be in compliance with both simultane-
ously. Cf Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984) (federal regulation
prohibiting cable television operators from deleting out-of-state signals preempts a state
law punishing cable operators who did not delete the signals).
221 The examination of incentives to behavior is classic economic analysis. See W.
LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); A. Po-
LINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (1983); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986); Braithwaite, The Limits of Economism in Control-
ling Harmful Corporate Conduct, in READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF LAW AND
REGULATION 258 (1984).
222 A number of commentators have analyzed the economics of punitive damages
in great detail. See, e.g., Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL.
L. REV. 79 (1982); Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56
S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1982); Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against
Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1982); Priest, Punitive
Damages and Enterprise Liability, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 123 (1982); Schwartz, Deter-
rence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive Damages: A Comment, 56 S.
CAL. L. REV. 133 (1982).
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between paying punitive fines and complying with a comprehensive
federal regulatory and punitive scheme.223
The Ferebee court's refusal to acknowledge such a conflict is pred-
icated on the court's prediction of Chevron's reaction to the potential
coexistence of punitive damages defining egregious labeling behavior
and FIFRA's regulation of labeling. The availability of punitive dam-
ages, however, will create a new mix of costs that may encourage quite
different behavior on the part of Chevron and similar manufacturers.
Consider the following possible instances of double regulation that
Chevron may encounter. First, Chevron could face a state award of
punitive damages that delineates a less strict standard of appropriate
labeling behavior than FIFRA. Second, punitive damages might com-
mand behavior that is more cautious than the requirements of FIFRA.
Finally, an exemplary award might replicate the provisions for labeling
in FIFRA.
As argued earlier, if a manufacturer in the first two scenarios
above gears its labeling to state law, it will violate FIFRA.224 The
manufacturer will thereby avoid the often large cost of paying punitive
damages.2 25 However, it will incur the costs of discovering state label-
ing requirements through interim punitive damage awards, which may
change over time depending on new jury verdicts, and the expense of
changing labels accordingly. In addition, it will face the costs associated
with a violation of FIFRA, such as civil fines and the expenses of de-
fending against a civil or criminal action by the Attorney General.
There are, moreover, opportunity costs associated with spending time
and money on such a defense. Alternatively, if a manufacturer chooses
to comply with FIFRA, it will incur the highly speculative and poten-
tially huge cost of paying punitive damages to tort plaintiffs, as well as
the costs of civil litigation. 22 ' There are opportunity costs for spending
money in this manner as well. Although this choice avoids the cost of
noncompliance with FIFRA, the manufacturer will still face the static
cost of compliance arising from testing, monitoring of products, and in-
teracting with the EPA. Finally, the third possible scenario would al-
low a manufacturer to avoid or incur the costs of noncompliance with
223 See Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1540-42; Wilson, slip op. at 13; see also Silkwood,
464 U.S. at 257 ("Paying both federal fines and state-imposed punitive damages for the
same incident would not appear to be physically impossible.").
224 See supra notes 216-20 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 194-98 and accompanying text.
226 Litigation expenses can be a very significant proportion of a defendant manu-
facturer's expenses. For example, 62 cents of every dollar paid out by asbestos manu-
facturers and their insurers went to attorneys' fees and litigation expenses. See RE-
PORT, supra note 197, at 42.
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both regulations, as well as avoid or incur the costs arising from com-
pliance with double regulation.
Although no attempt is made here to quantify exact costs,227 it is
reasonable to predict that when faced with different state and federal
standards of labeling, noncompliance with FIFRA and compliance with
state labeling standards could become the less costly, more attractive
alternative. At the very least, the costs associated with the Ferebee sce-
nario of stricter state labeling standards divert attention from and dis-
courage compliance with EPA-developed labels and testing require-
ments. Discouraging compliance with federal law, of course, was
grounds for preemption under the Court decisions that favor the doc-
trine.228 In any case, the coexistence of state and federal labeling re-
quirements creates a conflict that Congress never intended to exist.
Even assuming, as the Ferebee court does, that Chevron will then peti-
tion the EPA for a new label in the hope of bringing state and federal
standards closer together, there is likely to be a considerable time lag
before the petition, if approved, will result in a new label.229 This
leaves defendants choosing between two labeling standards as they
await EPA approval and as new suits defining new labeling standards
arise. It is also unclear how the EPA will respond to a number of
different petitions that reflect labeling standards developed by as many
different states. If state and federal standards converge, as the third
scenario suggests, it is less easy to predict how a manufacturer will
respond to the costs of not complying with both. Certainly, compliance
with one would be less costly than compliance with two, which is the
situation that preemption of punitive damages would bring about.
Whether or not a corporate defendant actually bears the tort
award costs directly, as the Ferebee court suggests it will, also is far
227 The data available on the cost of compliance is not translated into values that
are comparable to the cost of punitive damages mentioned earlier. An appropriate com-
parison might juxtapose the annual costs of OPCL's compliance with FIFRA with the
annual costs of OPCL-related punitive damages and litigation. The following facts,
though, give a rough sense of what those compliance costs might be. In 1981, the aver-
age research and development cost of registering a pesticide under FIFRA was approx-
imately $6.9 million dollars. See Davies, The Effects of Federal Regulation on Chemi-
cal Industry Innovation, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1983, at 41, 51. "Of the
$450 million total pesticide industry research and development expenditures in 1981,
67% was devoted to development of new products, 25% to product expansion, and 8%
to registration and product defense." Id. Data for 1980 reveals that 34 companies spent
$38 million dollars on reregistration and product defense of all their pesticides. See
Hoerger, Beamer & Hanson, The Cumulative Impact of Health, Environmental, and
Safety Concerns on the Chemical Industry During the Seventies, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1983, at 57, 95 (table 24).
228 See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
221 It takes approximately two years to register a pesticide with the EPA. See
Davies, supra note 227, at 52.
19881
1342 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
from clear. The manufacturer may respond to the award by passing on
its increased costs to consumers via raising its prices.230 Thus, instead
of defendants bearing tort award costs directly, consumers would actu-
ally fund tort damages awarded to victims. Although insurance for pu-
nitive damages is prohibited in a few states,2"' a manufacturer with
insurance could fund such damages with its policy and pass on the costs
of premiums to consumers. The recent trend toward unusually large
tort awards and the possibility of multiple claimants, however, may in-
duce more serious reactions from Chevron. Tort awards could reach,
and some say have already reached, what Judge Friendly termed "cata-
strophic amounts,"2 2 making a defendant's financial collapse a realistic
possibility. To be sure, the probability that one punitive damage award
could cause a company like Chevron to collapse is low; however, that
probability increases as the number of awards increase or as the
amount of the defendant's liability insurance decreases.2 3
One commentator has assessed a range of alternative strategic re-
actions of a corporation to mass tort liability.3 4 As a protective mea-
sure, a corporation could set up a separate subsidiary to sell its more
dangerous products, and thereby minimize the risk of liability "over-
whelming the entire firm. 23 5 This might be followed by a sale of the
subsidiary to shareholders to further reduce exposure to potential liabil-
ity.23 Another response would entail a "strategic liquidation of the
firm," which would require that the firm operate just outside of bank-
ruptcy and "consign it[self] to a slow, bleeding, perhaps decades-long
rundown."2 Finally, the corporation might pursue a mass tort bank-
ruptcy reorganization that makes tort claimants substantial owners of
the firm. 8'
230 See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 1967). It
should be noted that in a competitive market, it is unlikely that a manufacturer could
pass all these costs onto its consumers and still maintain its competitive market position.
Chevron, however, has a near monopoly in the production and sale of OPCL in the
United States, see supra text following note 36, making it more likely that it will be
able to pass such costs on to consumers.
231 See Seltzer, supra note 147, at 51 n.76.
232 Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 841.
23 The resulting failure of the business enterprise seems to be a needless, unwar-
ranted consequence of the litigation. See id. It is quite unfair to stockholders, moreover,
who "suffer[] extinction of their investments for a single management sin." Id. Indeed,
much like consumers, stockholders also could end up funding tort awards and being
punished for management's misdeeds.
234 See Roe, Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REv. 1
(1986).
235 Id. at 4-5.
I3 See id. at 5.
237 Id.
2 See id. at 6. Several corporations have filed for bankruptcy in the past under
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The punitive costs stemming from the distribution of one product,
such as OPCL, could have ramifications for the manufacture of other
products as well. As the size of individual tort awards increases and as
claims multiply, Chevron will have to incorporate these costs into the
feasibility projection of a new product. In light of these added costs,
other costs associated with the new product must be cut if the profit
margin is to remain the same.2" 9 Chevron might choose to cut back on
some of the testing required by the EPA or at least the additional test-
ing Chevron conducts over and above FIFRA requirements. Such cost
constraints might even deter Chevron from launching the product at
all,24° thereby depriving the consuming public of a potentially useful
product.
The exact magnitude of Chevron's response to the scenario created
by the Ferebee decision, of course, is very difficult to forecast. Much
may depend on how efficient Chevron is at cost avoidance. 241 The less
efficient Chevron is at avoiding or absorbing the costs of punitive dam-
age awards, the more dramatic will be its reaction to these awards; this,
in turn, suggests that serious conflicts with FIFRA could arise. More-
over, the gravity of these conflicts may depend on the market for
OPCL. Assume, for example, that other manufacturers eventually de-
velop substitute pesticides and this variety of products creates a rela-
tively elastic demand for any particular pesticide. If Chevron responds
to punitive damages by passing such costs on to consumers, the price
increase associated with its pesticide will cause buyers to switch from
Chevron's pesticide to that of another manufacturer.242 Chevron, there-
fore, will be unable to pass on these additional costs to its consumers
and will directly bear the cost of paying multiple exemplary awards.
The seriousness of Chevron's reaction also may depend on the
these circumstances, including several asbestos manufacturers. See Roe, Bankruptcy
and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 846, 847 n.5 (1984).
2.9 See Davies, supra note 227, at 52 ("For a large firm deciding whether to
market a major new product, the direct regulatory costs are unlikely to significantly
influence the decision. Data obtained from one large company on typical costs for de-
veloping a new pesticide indicate that the added regulatory costs of $1 million would
not significantly influence the decision to market the pesticide. On the other hand, for a
firm deciding whether to make a single small-volume batch of a new chemical, at cost
of maybe $10,000 to $30,000, almost any regulatory costs may influence the decision to
proceed." (footnote omitted)).
"0 See McKean, Product Liability: Implications of Some Changing Property
Rights, in READINGS IN THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW AND REGULATION, supra
note 221, at 127, 131.
241 See W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 221, at 120.
242 Currently, though, Chevron has monopoly control over pesticide pricing. See
supra note 230.
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amount of risk that is associated with its costs.""2 Assume that Chevron
is risk-averse and that insurance has not mitigated this aversion signifi-
cantly. Contemporary empirical evidence suggests that companies like
Chevron face the risk of paying very large punitive damages in failure-
to-warn tort cases.24 The exact size of these awards is also an ever-
changing variable. Although the trier of fact's discretion over an award
of punitive damages is limited by the requirement that the award ex-
hibit a reasonable relationship to the actual damages sustained by a
victim, recent history indicates that no such relationship exists.z " The
size of the award is particularly uncertain, moreover, in that it is based
on the trier of fact's subjective view of the egregiousness of the defend-
ant's behavior. Because the risk of a large punitive damage award is
high, and the potential size of that award indeterminable, the impact of
the state's regulatory directive through jury fines will be exacerbated.
At the very least, economic analysis suggests that unpredictable, large
state tort awards provide risk-averse manufacturers with a notable dis-
incentive to comply with federal standards. Thus, the granting of these
awards conflicts with the objectives and functioning of FIFRA.
V. JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO
CONFLICTING REGULATION OF PESTICIDE LABELING
The problems created by the coexistence of FIFRA's regulatory
scheme and the award of punitive damages in failure-to-warn tort cases
call for either a judicial or legislative solution. The occupation analysis
offered in this Comment indicates that the appropriate judicial response
to these problems is preemption, a response supported by the fact that
Congress explicitly and implicitly intended to control the regulation of
pesticide labeling. The conflicts that exist between FIFRA and punitive
damage awards also militate in favor of preemption. The regulatory
nature of exemplary awards conflicts with FIFRA's regulatory scheme,
creating tensions that make it difficult and inefficient for manufacturers
to pay punitive awards and comply with FIFRA simultaneously. Im-
portantly, preemption of punitive damage awards would still preserve a
claimant's ability to obtain compensation, thus preserving the states'
243 See generally A. POLINSKY, supra note 221, at 51-56 (discussing risk bearing
and insurance).
244 See supra notes 194-98 and accompanying text; see also Dworkin, Federal
Reform of Product Liability Law, 57 TUL. L. REv. 602, 602-606, 615 (1983) (noting
that jury awards, including punitive damage awards, have increased in products liabil-
ity cases more than in any other area of the law).
'" See Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MIcH. L.
REv. 1258, 1320 (1976) (noting the risk that a jury will overpunish a manufacturer
through punitive damage awards).
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ability to compensate tort victims-a function that is traditionally left to
local control.
Judicial preemption should be supplemented with several legisla-
tive responses. Congress should amend FIFRA to provide a more ex-
plicit delineation of federal and state regulatory responsibilities.246 The
state functions listed under Sections 24(a) and 24(c) of the statute
should be more clearly distinguished from the federal labeling responsi-
bilities set forth in Section 24(b) with an explicit prohibition of state
regulatory activities that have the effect of creating labeling require-
ments. This amendment will strengthen motions to preempt punitive
damages such as those made by Chevron by limiting the court's role in
deciding whether or not punitive damages have a regulatory effect, be-
cause it implicitly assumes that the effect exists and is substantial. Such
an amendment, however, poses the same dilemma faced by the courts in
Wilson v. Chevron Chemical Co.247 and Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical
Co.:248 given a federal law that purports to distribute regulatory power
between federal and state authorities, how does a court respond to over-
lapping regulatory activities? To solve this dilemma, Congress should
amend Section 24(b) to explicitly prohibit state regulation of labeling
through punitive damages in failure-to-warn cases, pursuant to its
supremacy clause power to allocate regulatory power between federal
and state authorities.2 49 Alternatively and less drastically, Congress
could enact a presumption in favor of preemption of punitive damages
in failure-to-warn cases.
In addition, any amendment to FIFRA should also increase the
fines and penalties associated with a violation of the statute. Increasing
the costs of noncompliance with FIFRA would refocus manufacturer
attention on the federal statute and reduce the conflict between state
and federal law. Increasing the impact of FIFRA's punitive scheme,
moreover, will give the statute greater regulatory effect, hopefully ful-
filling some of the goals that state juries seek to achieve through puni-
246 One solution to the problem of disparate state laws is the enactment of uni-
form statutes. See Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUm. L.
REV. 489, 538 (1954). "Here again, however, one of the main sticking points is the
problem of securing uniform judicial interpretation." Id.
17 No. 83-762 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1986).
248 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
248 In the words of Chief Justice Warren, "[i]f Congress had specifically provided
that the states were without power to award damages under such circumstances, or it
had expressly sanctioned such redress in state courts, our course of action would be
clear." Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 647 (1967) (Warren, C.J., dis-
senting) (suggesting an amendment to the Taft-Hartley Act preempting a state's power
to assess compensatory and punitive damages against a union for denying a worker
access to a plant during a strike).
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tive awards, yet in a more efficient manner than is possible with a
multitude of exemplary awards.
Finally, state legislatures could significantly limit the size of puni-
tive damage awards. Indeed, a chorus of commentators has supported
such a move for some time.250 Some legislatures already have moved in
this direction, not for the purposes of reducing the conflict with federal
statutes, but because the size of punitive awards is excessive. 251 Reduc-
ing the size of these awards would at least weaken their regulatory
effect and mitigate the consequences that flow from the disincentive to
comply with FIFRA that such awards create. Nor will state regulation
through large jury awards of punitive damages be missed. The federal
effort to control pesticide manufacturers is clearly better financed, has
the benefit of greater expertise, and provides a more effective compre-
hensive approach to promoting the safe use of pesticides than the efforts
made by state courts. Federal regulation of labeling through the appli-
cation of FIFRA will save these manufacturers from facing the costs
and choices that accompany double regulation.
CONCLUSION
Wilson v. Chevron Chemical Company252 and Ferebee v. Chevron
Chemical Company253 provide two recent examples of the ongoing doc-
trinal and practical conflict between a comprehensive federal law and
the award of punitive damages in state failure-to-warn tort suits. This
Comment argues that Congress both explicitly and implicitly intended
FIFRA to preempt state efforts at labeling pesticide products by occu-
pying this domain of regulation. Preemption is also proper because pu-
nitive damages have a regulatory effect that conflicts with the labeling
provisions and the punitive scheme in the federal statute. The regula-
tory effect of large exemplary awards may discourage companies like
Chevron from complying with FIFRA requirements and induce a vari-
250 See, e.g., Duffy, supra note 195, at 4 ("The doctrine of punitive damages is an
anomaly in the law. . . . [T]he purpose for which punitive damages were created no
longer exists. The doctrine is an anachronism and should be abolished."); Wheeler, The
Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REv.
269, 298-300 (1983) (supporting statutes that limit punitive damages and "express the
legislature's judgment about the optimal amount of civil punishment for the most egre-
gious instances of a particular form of misconduct"); Note, supra note 183, at 1161
(arguing that in most cases criminal punishment more effectively deters undesirable
conduct than do punitive damages).
251 See, e.g., Florida Legislature Votes "Tort Reform" Aimed at Cutting Insur-
ance Rates 40%, Wall St. J., June 9, 1986, at 2, col. 3; Tort-Reform Movement Shifts
to States, Wash. Post, Feb. 10, 1986, at 42, col. 2 (Washington Business section).
252 No. 83-762 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1986).
253 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
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ety of other responses that ultimately will frustrate FIFRA's congres-
sionally determined goals.
This Comment argues for preemption of punitive damage claims
associated with failure-to-warn tort cases brought against manufactur-
ers regulated by FIFRA. In addition, it proposes a number of legisla-
tive responses designed to resolve the preemption dilemma, such as an
amendment to FIFRA that either prohibits state action that impacts
labeling or explicitly preempts exemplary awards in failure-to-warn
cases. Alternatively, Congress could increase the fines imposed on viola-
tors of FIFRA, thereby reducing the conflict created by complying with
the federal law and paying exemplary fines. This legislation will both
encourage the judicial response of preemption and affirmatively prevent
the conflicts and costs that arise under the coexistence of FIFRA and
punitive damages.

